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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

This Court has jurisdiction of this Petition for Review pursuant to Article 8, § 3 of
the Utah Constitution; Utah Code Ann., §§35A-4-508(8)(a), 35A-1-302(3), 78A-4-103,
63G-4-403; and Rule 14 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Are the Workforce Appeals Board's findings of fact regarding Petitioner Fur
~

Breeders Agricultural Cooperative's hiring of off-duty police officers for security
services supported by substantial evidence?
Was it reasonable and rational for the Workforce Appeals Board to conclude that
the services performed by off-duty police officers for the Petitioner, Fur Breeders
Agricultural Cooperative, should be considered employment subject to unemployment
insurance coverage pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §35A-4-204?
STANDARD OF REVIEW

The determination of whether a worker is an independent contractor "involves a
fact-sensitive inquiry into the unique facts of a particular employment relationship."

Evolocity, Inc. v. Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2015 UT App 61,

,r

6, 347 P.3d 406.

"Because this inquiry 'will differ in every case due to the individuality of fact patterns
and the vagaries of various vocations,"' a reviewing court "grants deference to the
Department in its weighing of the relevant factors to arrive at its ultimate decision." Id.
(quoting BMS Ltd. 1999, Inc. v. Department of Workforce Servs., 2014 UT App 111,

,r

13,327 P.3d 578). Accordingly, the Department's decision may be reversed "only if it is
clearly erroneous or falls outside the scope of the afforded deference." Id. "To establish
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clear error, the challenging party must show that a finding is not supported by legally
sufficient evidence even when the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to the
finding." State v. Cater, 2014 UT App 207, ,r 10, 336 P.3d 32.
Whether the Workforce Appeals Board (the "Board") correctly evaluated the
employment status of the off-duty police officers employed by the Petitioner is a factintensive question of law. The Utah Supreme Court has held that cases involving factintensive inquiries at the agency level do not lend themselves "to consistent resolution by
a uniform body of appellate precedent." Carbon County v. Workforce Appeals Bd., 2013
UT 41, ,r 7,308 P.3d 477 (quoting In re Adoption of Baby B., 2012 UT 35, ,r 42,308 P.3d
382). In such cases, "the appellate court would be in an inferior position to review the
correctness of the decision," so agency determinations are given deference. Id. (quoting
Baby B., 2012 UT 35, ,r 43). Accordingly, reviewing courts "do not reweigh the evidence

or substitute our decision for that of the Department but instead will uphold its
determinations if they are supported by the record evidence." Evolocity, 2015 UT App
61,,r6.
The Board's "ultimate determination" as well as "its intermediate conclusions" are
entitled to deference unless the Court "conclude[s] they are irrational or unreasonable."
Tasters Ltd. v. Department of Workforce Servs., 863 P.2d 12, 19 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

To determine whether the Board's decision was reasonable and rational, the reviewing
court applies a "substantial evidence test," which involves examining "all of the evidence
supporting the Board's findings" as well as "all reasonable inferences that can be drawn
therefrom," and then sustaining the Board's findings unless they "are not supported by
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substantial evidence given the record as a whole." Petro-Hunt, LLC v. Department of

Workforce Servs., 2008 UT App 391,

,r 20,

197 P.3d 107, cert. denied, 205 P.3d 103

(Utah 2009); see also Utah Code Ann. 630-4-403(4)(g). Further, "It is the province of
the Board ... to resolve conflicting evidence, and where inconsistent inferences can be
drawn from the same evidence, it is for the Board to draw the inferences." Carbon

County, 2013 UT 41,

,r 6.

A finding of fact by the Board "is supported by sufficient

evidence if the whole body of record evidence would be adequate to satisfy a reasonable
mind of the conclusion[.]" Smith v. Workforce Appeals Board, 2011 UT App 68,

,r 18,

252 P.3d 372.

STATUTES AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS AT ISSUE
The statutes and rules that are determinative in this matter are set forth verbatim in
Addendum A, and include the following:
§35A-4-204, Utah Code Annotated
§35A-4-508, Utah Code Annotated
§630-4-403, Utah Code Annotated
R994-204-303, Utah Admin. Code
R994-508-l l 1(4), Utah Admin. Code

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below.

The question in this case is whether the services the off-duty police officers
performed on behalf of Petitioner Fur Breeders Agricultural Cooperative (FBAC) were
exempt from coverage under the Utah Employment Security Act (ESA).
3
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On July 20, 2015, the Utah Department of Workforce Services (the "Department")
commenced an audit to determine whether certain off-duty Unified Police Department
("UPD") officers connected with FBAC should be classified as independent contractors
or employees.

FBAC reported that these UPD officers were independent contractor

1099 employees while performing services for FBAC. The Department assigned the
matter to a Department auditor to determine if the services the officers performed for
FBAC constituted employment subject to the Employment Security Act under Utah Code

Ann. §35A-4-204. In an Audit Report issued March 1, 2016, the auditor determined the
officers' services were not exempt from unemployment insurance coverage as they were
not engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession, or business
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §35A-4-204(3). (All Utah Code provisions are found
sequentially at Addendum A, the auditor's decision at Addendum B).
FBAC appealed the auditor's determination on March 4, 2016. A hearings officer
then consulted with Mr. Dale Christensen (financial officer for FBAC), and Mr. Scott
Rawlings (Legal Counsel for FBAC). Kenneth Hansen (Coordinator for UPD), Heather
Lyn Drips (UPD Detective), and Zach Bench (UPD Detective) also participated in the
hearing. On July 20, 2016, the hearings officer issued a decision which affirmed the
auditor's decision and concluded the officers had provided personal services for a wage,
constituting employment which was subject to unemployment insurance coverage.
(Addendum C).
FBAC appealed the decision on July 28, 2016. A hearing was held before an
administrative law judge (ALJ) on October 5, 2016. Witnesses for FBAC participated in
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the hearing along with the field auditor, a field audit supervisor, and the field audit
manager. On October 12, 2016, the ALJ issued his decision, affirming the decision
below. (Addendum D). FBAC appealed the ALJ's decision to the Workforce Appeals
Board (Board) on November 11, 2016.
On December 7, 2016, the Board unanimously affirmed the ALJ's decision.
(Addendum E). FBAC filed a petition for review with this Court on December 22, 2016.

B.

Statement of the Facts.

The Board supplements and corrects FBAC's Statement of the Facts as follows:
FBAC manufactures and distributes animal feed to farmers who raise animals for
their fur, primarily mink ranchers. (Record, 113: 14-19).

FBAC had concerns about

threats of destruction of its property from individuals who oppose the fur industry. (R,
114: 8-11). FBAC wanted additional security and a greater police presence around its
facility. (R, 114: 8-21). FBAC contacted the Unified Police Department (UPD) about
using police officers. (R, 115: 6-9 and 123: 32-37). UPD has a secondary employment
program that coordinates secondary employment for its police officers. According to
UPD policy, police officers are prohibited from working outside the UPD to provide
uP

security services unless they go through the secondary employment program. (R, 125: 41
to 126:2; and 126: 30-45). During the years 2014 and 2015, the individuals listed as
employees on pages 21 through 27 of the hearing record provided services to FBAC as
security guards. (R, 113: 21-43). FBAC paid the officers directly, after UPD provided
the names and times the officers provided services to FBAC. (R, 114: 28-32). FBAC
issued 1099 tax forms to the officers each year. (R, 113: 38). UPD set the fee for the
5
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officers' services at $30 per hour. (R, 115: 27-34). All of the officers who worked for
FBAC were employees of the UPD. (R, 115: 21-25; and 116: 10). The UPD scheduled
the officers according to FBAC's needs. The officers provided services on an as-needed
basis, mostly when no one was around the property. (R, 121: 4-7 and 20-23). The UPD
pays officers $700 per year so they can purchase any tools or equipment or supplies
needed to provide services as a police officer. (R, 127: 25-33). This amount is not always
sufficient to cover all costs.

Sometimes the officers purchase items using their own

money. (R, 128: 9). The officers also provided services to other businesses through the
UPD secondary employment program. {R, 129: 3-12).

The officers enroll in the

secondary employment program with the UPD to be considered available for secondary
jobs. They indicate when they are available to provide these services. (R, 130: 18-29).
When the officers provided services to FBAC they wore UPD uniforms and drove UPD
vehicles. (R, 116: 43 to 117:2; and 126: 16-20). FBAC provided no training and did not
require the officers to follow any instructions as to how to provide their services. (R, 119:
45 to 120: 9). The officers were not required to perform their job in any certain pace or
sequence. (R, 120: 11-15).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Board reasonably and rationally concluded FBAC failed to proffer sufficient
evidence to show that any of the UPD officers were independently established in a
business to provide security services.

Utah law, by default, considers all workers to be

employees for the purposes of unemployment insurance compensation unless it is shown
6
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~

otherwise on a case-by-case basis.

To overcome that presumption, FBAC must

demonstrate that the UPD officers are, instead, independent contractors. An independent
contractor is one who is regularly and customarily engaged in an independently
established trade. An independently established trade is one that is created and exists
apart from a relationship with a particular employer and does not depend on a
relationship with any one employer for its continued existence. Utah Admin. Code R994204-303( l )(a). When addressing workers whose services are commonly found to be
independent contractors, the decision-maker must perform the fact-specific analysis
dictated by Utah law.
FBAC has the burden of proof to show the officers were not employees through a
preponderance of competent evidence, meaning the evidence must be more than mere
hearsay. In this case, FBAC failed to proffer sufficient legal evidence competent in a
court of law in its attempt to establish the officers' status as independent contractors.
None of the affected officers were present to testify and therefore did not provide
firsthand information regarding whether they were customarily engaged in an
independently established business or profession.

Likewise, the three Employer

witnesses provided insufficient firsthand testimony and did not show the UPD officers
were independently established. As the Employer failed to sustain its burden, and as the
ALJ may only base findings on a residuum of legal evidence competent in a court of law,
it could not be determined that the UPD officers were not employees of FBAC.
Therefore, the ALJ and the Board correctly found the UPD officers to be employees and
not independent contractors.
7
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE BOARD REASONABLY AND RATIONALLY
CONCLUDED
THE
UPD
OFFICERS
WERE
EMPLOYEES FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE UTAH
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT.

Utah law presumes individuals performing services for a wage are employees
unless the employer can show to the satisfaction of the Department that 1) the individual
is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession or
business of the same nature as that involved in the contract for hire services; and 2) the
individual has been and will continue to be free from control or direction over the means
of perfonnance of those services, both under the individual's contract of hire and in fact.
Utah Code Ann. §35A-4-204(3).
Both parts of the test must be met in order to find the worker is an independent
contractor.

Id.

Therefore, if an employer fails to show a worker was customarily

engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession, or business, then it
has failed to·· demonstrate he was an independent contractor and the analysis need not
reach the question of direction and control. See McGuire v. Department of Employment

Security, 768 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah App. 1989).
In addition, inadmissible hearsay evidence, or other evidence lacking legal
competency in a court of law, cannot alone support a finding of fact. Prosper Team, Inc.
v. Dep 't of Workforce Servs., 2011 UT App 142, ,r 11 (Utah Ct. APP. 2011 ), citing Salt

Lake Donated Dental Servs., Inc. v. Dep't of Workforce Servs. 2011 UT App 7, ,r 14,246
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P.3d 1206. The Board's findings must be supported by a residuum of legal evidence
competent in a court of law. Id.
The Board, after conducting a fact-specific analysis, determined FBAC did not
proffer sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption the UPD officers were employees.
FBAC has failed to show the Board's decision was not supported by substantial evidence.
A.

The Board's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence
in light of the record as a whole.

FBAC appears to take issue with some of the Board's factual findings, although it
is sometimes difficult to tell which specific findings FBAC disputes. Further, FBAC's
briefing often does not clearly distinguish between findings of fact and the Board's
ultimate conclusions. In any event, however, FBAC has failed to meet the heavy burden
necessary to overturn any of the Board's findings of fact.
First, FBAC has failed to marshal the evidence in support of the findings with
which it disagrees. "A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record
evidence that supports the challenged finding." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). As the Utah
Supreme Court has held, a party that fails to marshal the evidence "will almost certainly
fail to carry its burden of persuasion on appeal[.]" State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10,

,r 42,

326 P.3d 645. FBAC's brief contains long and repetitive stretches in which it repeats its
view of the evidence, see Br.Appellant. at 14-18, 21-26, but nowhere in the brief does
FBAC address the evidence supporting the Board's findings or analyze whether that
evidence can sustain those findings. See Br.Appellant, passim. Indeed, it is difficult for
the Board to respond to FBAC's arguments without a clear understanding of which
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findings of fact FBAC is disputing. That alone is a proper basis for affirming the Board's
findings of fact.
Further, the specific findings with which FBAC takes issue appear to consist of
findings made by the initial hearing officer that FBAC asserts were not made by the ALJ
or the Board.

See Br.Appellant at 15-17.

FBAC' s dispute over these findings is

somewhat puzzling because all but one of the findings were essentially made by the ALJ
and then incorporated by the Board:
HEARING OFFICER FINDING:
"Officers access the system twice a month
and submit their name for jobs they are
interested in working." (Record, 82.)

"Some of the equipment is purchased by
[the workers] and some of it _is the property
ofUPD." (Record, 82.)

"The scheduling is handled by UPD' s
software system." (Record, 83.)

"The Appellant and their staff have very
little interaction with the Officers during
their shift." (Record, 83.)

ALJ FINDING:
"The officers enroll m the secondary
employment program with the UPD in
order to be available for secondary jobs and
indicate when they would be available to
provide these services." (Record, 13 8.)
"The UPD pays officers $700 per year for
them to purchase any tools or equipment or
supplies needed to provide services as a
police officer. Often this amount is not
sufficient to cover all costs and the officers
at times may purchase items using their
own money." (Record, 13 8.)
"The officers enroll m the secondary
employment program with the UPD in
order to be available for secondary jobs and
indicate when they would be available to
provide these services. The UPD would
then schedule the officers according to the
Appellant's needs." (Record, 138.)
"The Appellant did not require the officers
to follow any instructions as to how to
provide their services.
The Appellant
provided no training and did not require
them to perform their services in any
certain pace or sequence." (Record, 13 8.)
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The sole fact identified by FBAC and not found by the ALJ-that "[o]fficers are
trained on how to handle various incidents and threats"-does not appear to be relevant
to the employment analysis. See Br.Appellant at 16. In addition, FBAC devotes pages of
its brief to attempting to introduce additional facts that are not included in the record on
appeal and are not supported by the existing record; those assertions should not be
considered. See Br.Appellant at 24-25.
More fundamentally, the root of FBAC's complaint appears to be that the
testimony presented before the hearing officer was not included in the record before the
ALJ or the Board. Although FBAC cites, out of context, a statement from the ALJ that
he "may use" the hearing officer's decision in making his decision (along with the rest of
the documents presented to the hearing officer), see Br.Appellant at 15, the ALJ made
clear during the hearing that testimony taken before the hearing officer was not properly
before the ALJ. In fact, the ALJ invited FBAC's counsel to continue the hearing or hold
it open if necessary to take testimony from the witnesses who had testified before the
hearing officer:

JUDGE

Mr. Falco any questions about how we will proceed with the
testimony portion of the hearing?

FALCO

Yeah I just have one. We had the previous hearing and we were told
in that hearing that the only thing that would be submitted in evidence
would be the tape recordings of that hearing to make sure that
everything was on the record. I'm wondering why we're having a
second hearing I guess.

JUDGE

We're having a second hearing because you filed an appeal of that
determination and, um, you have the right to file an appeal. Once you
file an appeal of the hearing officers determination - that was not a
formal administrative hearing that was held with the hearing officer.

11
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That was just an administrative hearing that, uh, the Department has
decided to have in-between the auditors Decision and the
Administrative Law Judge who holds a formal administrative hearing.
It's just another, uh, line of appeal that the Department has allowed
appellant's and parties to - to have.
So, this is a formal
administrative hearing that's required by law. What you went
through before was not.

FALCO

So, is that tape then not part of this hearing at all or does ...

JUDGE

That is not part of this hearing. This is a (unintelligible) hearing. I
will take all new evidence and make a - a Decision of - of my
own. Um, you can provide any and all of the same evidence or
testimony that you provided, uh, to the hearing officer, um, but at
this point that's not made a part of this record since this is a
(unintelligible) hearing.

RAWLINGS

Judge, this is Scott Rawlings. I - what troubles me though is that we
were advised at that prior hearing that it was a recorded record
and because of that we brought two employees that provide the
service that are licensed officer with Unified Police and I think
they're testimony was valid and I think it was a reasonable
assumption because we were told it was a recorded record that would
bear - come part of, uh, this matter. But both people aren't here.
I'm wondering if we are prejudice by that.

JUDGE

Well, if you need to get them here or if you feel like you need
them as a witness I can continue the hearing for - for another
time, but I wanna go ahead and take care of what we can today. Uh,
that - that hearing officers recording is - I - I've never had that as
part of the record as an Administrative Law Judge. Uh, if - if she
told you that I don't know - I'm not sure why. She'll have to answer
to that as to why she told you that. Maybe she believed that that was
the case, but it's never been a part of - of the record. Um, so, again,
if you want additional witnesses because you believe that that
would be part of the record then, uh, we can continue the hearing
until you can get them. If you can get them on - this is - this is a
telephone hearing. I can contact them wherever they're - they're
located and conference them into the hearing and take their
testimony if it's what you feel is necessary. Um ...

FALCO

I don't know that that's a possibility, but I think I concur with your
assessment by telling you what we can and then if it. ..

JUDGE

Okay.
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FALCO

... becomes problematic then maybe we'll have that portion to be
continued to a ...

JUDGE

Okay.

FALCO

. . . (unintelligible) in the future.

JUDGE

Well, yeah. Just make sure you address that before the end of the
hearing if you - if you want that to make place, if you want a
continuous I'll consider that at that time and, uh, - and, uh, we can go
forward at that time and make that - I'll make that determination.

(Record, 109-110.) (emphasis added)
At the end of the hearing, the ALJ again gave FBAC the opportunity to call the witnesses
that had testified before the hearing officer:

JUDGE

Alright. Going back to the issue of, uh, whether or not the Appellant
wanted additional witnesses to be available that they understood did
not need to be available today. Uh, Mr. Falco, does the Appellant
want to continue the Hearing to obtain additional testimony from
anyone else?

FALCO

Um, you know I feel like there's been enough evidence to show
that we don't meet the criteria 's outlined by the guidelines. I
don't see any reason to bring them in. I guess it would be whether
Judge you feel like you needed to find out if they were at risk, at loss,
and whether they spent some of the stuff or their tax forms. I guess
that- that'd be up to your determination I guess.

HANSEN

Judge can I - if - if there is a question about the lost part of this we
do have employers who once in a while do not pay the officers. So,
there is a risk.

JUDGE

Okay. Um, I don't believe I have any questions for them on - on that
issue of- of the lost. I mean I understand it's a given that a client or
someone can - cannot pay someone so, I understand that. Um, did
you want them - it's up to the Appellant whether you want to feel like you wanna call any ...

FALCO

I think we're fine.

(Record, 133-134.) ( emphasis added)
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Thus, FBAC was aware the testimony taken by the hearing officer would not be
part of the record, was given an opportunity to make that testimony part of the record,
and declined to do so. Accordingly, FBAC waived its right to supplement the record
below and cannot now complain about factual findings that were not included in the
record. More broadly, FBAC has not established that any of the Board's findings of fact
should be overturned.

B.

The Board reasonably and rationally concluded the workers
providing security for FBAC were employees and not independent
contractors.

Utah Admin. Code R994-204-303{l){a) states:
An individual will be considered customarily engaged
in an independently established trade, occupation, profession
or business if the individual is, at the time the service is
performed, regularly engaged in a trade, occupation,
profession or business of the same nature as the service
performed, and the trade, occupation, profession, or business
is established independently of the alleged employer.
In New Sleep v. Department of Employment Sec., the Utah Supreme Court noted
several factors that should be considered when determining whether a worker created an
independently established business separate from an employer.

703 P.2d 289 (Utah

1985). 1 The workers in New Sleep installed water-beds for customers who purchased
them from the employer. Id. at 289-90.

The Court found the installers were not

1

This case was decided before the factors in Utah Admin. Code R994-204-303
were delineated. The Court, however, addressed the broader question regarding the
independently established portion of the independent contractor test that is still intact at
Utah Code. Ann. § 35A-4-204(3). The factors in R994-204-303 were created as a result
of court decisions such as New Sleep.
14
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independently established in their own businesses as water-bed installers, in part because
the installers were not known to anyone besides that employer to be installers in the
industry; they did not hold themselves out to the public as being engaged in the business
of installation of water beds; they were recruited for the job because they were neighbors
and friends of the employer's manager, not because they were already in the trade or
business of installing water-beds; they had no clientele that called for their services; they
had no place of business; they did no advertising; they had no contractor's or business
licenses; and there was no evidence the workers actively sought installation work directly
from the public, only from the employer in question. Id. at 291. The Court went on to
say "while the presence of all of the foregoing indicia is certainly not necessary, the
absence of all of it leaves nothing to prove the existence of an independently established
business." Id.
In harmony with the Utah Supreme Court's rulings, this Court has held that when
determining whether a worker is customarily engaged in an independently established
business certain factors must be present, which include "holding oneself out to the public
generally as engaged in a particular business; advertising one's services; having an
established clientele; having a place of business; having a contractor's or business license;
having special skills as a result of an apprenticeship prior; and having a substantial
investment in tools necessary to do the work." Ellison Inc. v. Board of Review of the
Industrial Commission of Utah, 749 P.2d 1280, 1283-84 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Adopting this precedent, Utah Admin. Code R994-204-303(l)(b) provides seven
factors intended to aid a decision maker's analysis of whether a worker was customarily
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engaged in an independently established business. These factors include: I) Separate
Place of Business, 2) Tools and Equipment, 3) Other Clients, 4) Profit or Loss, 5)
Advertising, 6) Licenses, and 7) Business Records and Tax Forms.
It is important to note these factors are "intended only as aids in the analysis of the
facts of each case." Petro-Hunt, 2008 UT App 391, ,r 20, 21; see also Utah Admin. Code
R994-204-303. Indeed, the degree of importance of each factor varies depending on the
service and the factual context in which it is performed. Id. "The appropriate weight to
assign to each factor in the test for whether an individual is an employee or an
independent contractor is a fact-sensitive question that will differ in every case due to the
individuality of fact patterns and the vagaries of various vocations .... Accordingly, this
is a 'fact-like' determination and, as a matter of institutional competence, we grant
deference to the Board's weighting of the factors." BMS, 2014 UT App 111, ,r 13. Here,
the Board correctly analyzed each individual factor and correctly weighed the importance
of the factors as it has the discretion to do.
1.

Separate Place o{Business.

The first factor asks whether the worker has a place of business separate from that
of the employer.

Utah Admin. Code R994-204-303(1)(b)(i).

Generally, when an

individual is running a service-type business there are two types of work that person must
perform: the actual service the business provides and managing the business. Granted,
some professions or businesses do not require a significant amount of time to manage.
Most businesses, however, need at least a modicum of management, such as tracking
business expenses, finding other clients, creating invoices, managing finances, etc. This
16
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work is typically completed at a separate place than that of a client's place of business.

See generally Barney v. Dep't of Employment Sec., 681 P.2d 1273, 1274-1275 (Utah
1984).
In the present case, FBAC failed to provide evidence to show any of the officers
had a separate place of business.

FBAC originally stated only that the law is not

applicable here because the law enforcement services it required were unique and could
only be performed at or near [its] premises. (R, 145: #4). FBAC argued to the Board that
each officer's residence could be considered a separated place of business because that
was where they presumably retained their own secondary employment records and
uniforms. (R, 146, # 18). I1;1 its brief, FBAC states the UPD officers were required to
apply for off-duty work through the UPD's Secondary Employment Coordinator, receive
approval, and then use UPD's Power Detail software to find off-duty employment
opportunities. (Brief of Appellant, pp. 22-23 ). FBAC then argues the UPD Secondary
Employment Office and software comprised a "separate and distinct entity apart from
UPD as a law enforcement agency", and this office provided a "separate place of
business" because it provided business records and record keeping to off-duty UPD
officers. (Brief of Appellant, pp. 26-27).
Administrative adjudicative findings must be supported by a residuum of legal
evidence competent in a court of law. Yacht Club v. Utah Liquor Control Comm 'n, 681
P.2d 1224, 1226 (Utah 1984); see also Utah Admin. Code R994-508-ll 1(4). The only
firsthand evidence FBAC provided on this issue was testimony that FBAC was not aware
of whether the officers had any other place of business other than at the UPD. (R, 116: 517
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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17).

During the hearing, the UPD detective in charge of the secondary employment

program indicated that officers who wanted any other employment had to go through
UPD's system in order to do so. He further testified that an officer who tried to start his
own security business would be in violation of the UPD secondary employment policy.
(R, 126: 30 through 127:9). More broadly, the Board reasoned that the nature of security
services is such that they cannot be performed anywhere other than the employer's place
of business, so the fact that the officers did all their work at FBAC's place of business
was not really determinative. (Record, 15 3.)
The only other evidence in the record pertaining to this factor consists of the
signed Status Questionnaires provided by seven officers as part of the initial field audit.
The officers were not under oath when they made these statements.

However, the

officers were asked whether they had established their own business. They were asked to
provide the name of their business and asked whether they had their own place of
business, to which all seven answered "no", "NIA", or indicated they worked for UPD.
(R, 39, 43, 51, 57, 61, 65, and 67). These officers did not appear at the hearing, and
therefore did not provide any first-hand testimony regarding this issue.
Without any first-hand testimony or a residuum of legally competent evidence to
suggest the contrary, the record lacked any evidence to show, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that any of the officers had a separate place of business. Therefore, the Board
could not make this finding.

The officers guarded property and deterred vandals at

FBAC' s property and did not have the option to perform this service elsewhere.
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Further, FBAC's argument that the UPD's secondary work system constituted a
"place of business" was not raised to the Board below and cannot be raised now. See,
e.g., Eichert v. Dep 't of Workforce Servs., 2002 UT App 35, ,I 7 n.2 (unpublished). And

even if it had been raised, a computer system does not constitute a location or "place of
business" for a provider of security services.
Given the nature of the services the workers provided, the Board reasonably
concluded the "separate place of business" factor was inapplicable.
2.

Substantial Investment in Tools or Equipment.

The second factor asks whether the worker has a substantial investment in tools,
equipment or facilities customarily required to perform the services. Utah Admin. Code
R994-204-303(1)(b)(ii). This factor weighs in favor of independence only if FBAC can
show the officers actually had a substantial investment in the tools and equipment
necessary to provide security services for FBAC.
FBAC argues UPD officers must, by necessity, make an investment in the tools of
their pnmary occupation that would also be mandated by for UPD secondary
employment.

It furthers argues that the officers law enforcement training and

certification is an investment for each officer who wishes to participate in the secondary
employment program.
FBAC did not meet its burden of proof on this issue. The FBAC witnesses were
not able to identify whether any of the officers used their own funds to purchased tools,
equipment, or supplies necessary to provide their services. (Record, 128: 11-15). The
record shows UPD provided vehicles and issued each officer a service firearm. (Record,
19
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127: 39).

UPD also gives its officers a $700 a year stipend to cover additional

equipment, such as body armor, lights, boots, or a more desirable weapon. (Record, 127:
25-33). There is no first-hand testimony or other legally competent evidence in the
record showing the officers incurred costs associated with purchasing equipment or
supplies. In order for the officers to be hired by FBAC they had to already be employed
as police officers. (Record, 127: 15-19).

There is no evidence any of the officers

purchased any additional equipment in order to perform services for FBAC. Without
clarifying testimony from the officers, or a witness for FBAC who has personal
knowledge on this issue, the preponderance of the evidence does not show the officers
actually made a substantial investment in the tools and equipment necessary for the job.
Even if FBAC had proven the officers made such purchases, the result here would
not change. This factor requires the officers to have made a substantial investment in
tools and equipment for the purpose of providing services in their allegedly
independently e·stablished business. If the officers purchased equipment for the purpose
of performing on-duty police work, and only incidentally used it for off-duty activities, it
is unlikely there was a substantial investment in tools and equipment.
The "tools" factor requires the Board to look at the facts as they existed, not as
they could exist. Because the record lacks sufficient legal evidence competent in a court
of law showing the officers made a substantial investment in the tools and equipment
customarily required to perform services for FBAC, this factor also weighs in favor of
employment.
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3.

Other Customers or Clients.

The third factor looks at whether the worker regularly performs services of the
same nature for other customers or clients and was not required to work exclusively for
the employer.

Utah Admin. Code R994-204-303(l)(b)(iii). The Board concluded this

factor weighed in favor of independence, so it is unclear why FBAC appears to challenge
the Board's determination. See Br.Appellant at 31-32.
4.

Profit or Loss.

The fourth factor asks whether the worker can realize a profit or risk a loss from
expenses and debts incurred through an independently established business. Utah Admin.
Code R994-204-303(1)(b)(iv). To prevail on this factor FBAC must demonstrate that the
UPD officers "can realize a profit or risks a loss from expenses and debts incurred
through an independently established business activity." Utah Admin. Code. R994-204303(b)(iv). See also Evolocity, 2015 UT App 61,

,r

18. FBAC argues only that an off-

duty officer's risk of loss would take place if he were not paid for services rendered and
missed out on an opportunity to provide services to another (paying) client.
FBAC failed to proffer legally competent evidence to show this factor weighs in
\J

favor of independence. The officers already had all the tools and equipment required to
perform services for FBAC. They had no risk of losses arising from expenses or debts
accumulated by working at FBAC, which is what this Court has previously held is
necessary to establish the type of profit or loss this factor requires. See Needle, Inc. v.
Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2016 UT App 85, ,r 32,372 P.3d 696. Every worker, whether

employee or independent contractor, is at some risk of non-payment, but that does not
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create "profit" or "loss" as contemplated by this factor. As there is no evidence the
officers could experience a loss, as there were no costs associated with the services they
provided and they had no significant expenses, this factor weighs in favor of
employment.

5.

Advertising.

The fifth factor asks whether the worker advertises services m telephone
directories, newspapers, magazines, the internet, or by other methods clearly
demonstrating an effort to generate business. Utah Admin. Code R994-204-303(b )(v).
The plain language of the Rule requires an inquiry into whether a worker "advertises
services," not whether a worker is free to advertise his or her services.

There is

insufficient legally competent evidence to support a finding the UPD officers advertised
their services or took actions to generate business. In its appeal to the Board, FBAC
argued the UPD secondary employment program thrived via word of mouth and that was
the most effective form of advertising the officers' service to the public. (R, 146: #15).
At the hearing, FBAC' s general manager stated only that "the advertisement to us was
their police car." (R, 118: 19-22). Thus, he lacked personal knowledge on this issue as
well. His testimony on this issue is not legal evidence competent in a court of law.
Further, these arguments miss the mark as far as the advertising factor goes. The rule
examines the workers' efforts to advertise their alleged business. FBAC may have heard
of the secondary employment program through word of mouth, but that does not establish
that the officers took steps to advertise their availability as security officers. Neither is
the testimony regarding the police cars amounting to advertising convincing. A UPD
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vehicle is not an advertisement that the officer behind the wheel is available for hire. The
Board correctly found this factor weighs in favor of employment.
Further, even if the hearsay evidence in the record were considered, it would not
change the outcome of this factor.

Six of the seven officers who provided a Status

Questionnaire to the Department field auditor stated they did not advertise their services.
The seventh officer did not answer the advertising question either way. (R, 39, 43, 51, 57,
61, 65, and 67). The Department auditor investigated the rest of the officers by checking
the yellow pages and internet directories.

He found no evidence that any of them

advertised their services as security officers.

This evidence does not show, by a

preponderance, the officers made any efforts to generate more business. FBAC has failed
to proffer a residuum of legally competent evidence to show the officers advertised their
services by a method intended to generate business.

This factor weighs in favor of

employment.

6.

Licenses.

The sixth factor addresses whether the officers obtained any required and
customary business, trade or professional licenses.
303(b)(vi).

Utah Admin. Code R994-204-

FBAC's general manager testified he did not know whether any of the

officers had a business license. He said it was enough to know they were licensed police
officers. (R, 118: 36 to 119: 8). The UPD secondary employment coordinator testified
the state statute said "law enforcement can't get a private security license" and cannot be
"private security agents." (R, 128: 27-30). He further testified that he did not know of
any officers who worked in private security. (R, 128: 40). None of the seven officers
23
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who filled out the Status Questionnaire indicated they had obtained a business license.
(R, 40, 44, 52, 58, 62, 66, and 68). The Department field auditor checked each officer for
active business licenses at the Department of Commerce. He found none of them were
independently established in their own businesses and did not meet the provisions of an
independent contractor. FBAC argues the officers were certified police officers and their
certification fulfills the licensure contemplated by the unemployment rules.

It is

undisputed the officers were trained and certified to be police officers. However, it is
their service as a business operator that is at issue. Some type of business license is
usually required by municipalities in order to operate an independently established
business. The UPD secondary employment coordinator testified that police officers are
prohibited by UPD policy and possibly state statute from independently providing
security services. In other words, employment as a police officer disqualifies one from
operating an independent business, and no business, trade, or professional license would
make any difference. At any rate, as there is no evidence presented that any of the
officers had a business license demonstrating an informed business decision to be
independently established as a security officer or law enforcement individual, this factor
weighs in favor of employment.

7.

Business Record-Keeping.

The seventh and final factor asks whether the officers maintained records or
documents that validate expenses, business asset valuation, or income earned in order to
file self-employment and other business tax forms with the IRS. Utah Admin. Code
R994-204-303(b)(vii). FBAC argues only that the Secondary Employment Program and
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the UPD Detail System software provided officers with job opportunities, requirements,
rates of pay, time logs, check collection, and check disbursement, as well as an annual
1099 IRS statement. It contends that these constitute the essential and reasonable records
one would expect in an established, excluded business. This argument was not raised
before the Board and cannot therefore be raised for the first time on appeal.
Further, FBAC's general manager testified the business issued 1099 tax forms to
the officers each year. However, he did not know whether the UPD officers maintained
records to deduct business expenses. (R, 119: 15-37). There is no evidence to show any
of the officers filed self-employment or other business tax forms with the IRS.
Furthermore, the fact FBAC issued 1099s is not dispositive of this issue. The factor asks
whether the workers maintained records or documents in order to file business or selfemployment tax forms.

Therefore, FBAC needs to show the officers kept or

"maintained" these types of records. FBAC failed to do so. Indeed, the company general
manager testified he did not have personal knowledge about whether the officers kept
records for the purpose of filing taxes with the IRS. His testimony, therefore, is not
legally competent evidence that can support a finding the officers kept records or
vi

documents for tax purposes. As this Court has previously held, the mere issuance of a
1099 does not necessarily satisfy this factor. See Needle, 2016 UT App 85, ,r,r 41-42.
The Board considered all of the evidence before it in making its findings. As
discussed in detail, the Board found portions of this evidence to be inadmissible hearsay
or not legally competent evidence admissible in a court of law.

The residuum rule

prevents the Board from basing a finding of fact on this evidence alone. In the instances
25
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the Employer failed to proffer evidence that was admissible hearsay or legally competent
evidence, and the Board could find no other legally competent evidence in the record on
point, the Board did not make a finding of fact. The Board, however, did consider all the
evidence admitted in the record.
8.

Weighing o{Factors.

Having applied the evidence in the record to the above factors and considered
them in the light of the broader question at issue, the Board's conclusion that the officers
were employees was reasonable and rational. FBAC failed to proffer sufficient legal
evidence competent in a court of law to rebut the presumption the officers were
employees. FBAC failed to show any of the officers had created a security or policing
business that existed independent of UPD. Indeed, there was insufficient evidence to
show the officers had a separate place of business, had a substantial investment in tools
and equipment, could realize a profit or risk a loss, advertised their services, owned
business or other licenses, or maintained records for the purpose of filing selfemployment or business tax forms with the IRS. Only one factor (other clients) weighed
in favor of independence. Therefore, the Board's conclusion that FBAC failed to provide
sufficient evidence to show the officers were independently established is both
reasonable and rational and the Board's decision should be upheld.
C.

The Board correctly interpreted and applied the law and relied on
facts supported by the record.

FBAC argues on appeal that the Board ignored the Utah Administrative
Procedures Act (UAP A) by failing to give due weight and credence to substantial
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evidence when viewed in light of the whole record, and that the facts of the case are at
odds with the Board's decision.
To convince the Court that the Board's decision was not based on substantial
evidence, FBAC points to inconsistencies between the findings of fact issued by the
Hearings Officer and the findings of fact enumerated by the ALJ and the Board.
FBAC misunderstands the roles of the ALJ and the Board. A hearing before an
ALJ is a de novo hearing, and the ALJ is not bound in any way to the Department's
original findings of fact, conclusions, or decision. In order to preserve the integrity of the
process and afford all parties an equal opportunity to present their case, an ALJ is
required to exercise independent judgment without regards to the desires of the
Department. In addition, under Utah statute and case law, the Board is entitled to draw
inferences differing from those of the Hearings Officer or the ALJ. The relevant statute
states, in part:
Any findings of fact or law, judgment, conclusion, or final order made by an
unemployment insurance hearing officer, administrative law judge, or any
person with the authority to make findings of fact or law in any action or
proceeding before the unemployment insurance appeals tribunal, is not
conclusive or binding in any separate or subsequent action or proceeding ...
Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-508(l){b). In 1980 the Utah Supreme Court ruled that the
Board, "in its review of the record made before the Administrative Law Judge, may make
its own findings on the credibility of the evidence presented." United States Steel Corp.
v. Industrial Comm'n, 607 P.2d 807, 811, (Utah 1980). Since that time, Utah appellate

courts have consistently ruled that findings by a lower authority are not binding in later
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agency review proceedings. See, e.g., Commercial Carriers v. Industrial Comm'n, 888
P .2d 707, 710 (Utah Ct. App. 1994): "While it is the ALJ who initially hears the
evidence, the Commission is the ultimate fact finder." In Chrysler Dodge Country v.
Department of Employment Sec., 751 P.2d 278, 281 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), this Court held
that, "the Board is a fact-finding body which has statutory authority to direct the taking of
new information, to make new findings of fact, to draw different conclusions of law, and
to reverse decisions of the referee." The petitioner in Red Cliffs Reg'/, Inc. v. Labor
Comm 'n, 1999 UT App 388, also attacked the Board's findings of fact because they
differed from those of the ALJ. In rejecting Red Cliffs contention, this Court stated that
''the relevant statute, which allows the Board to accept, modify, or reverse the ALJ's
findings and adopt its own, also supports our conclusion." Id. at 4. Very recently, this
Court held that "our review is limited to the final, operative order of the Department as
rendered by its appeals board." Evolocity, Inc. v. Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2015 UT
App 61, 2015 Utah App. LEXIS 62 (2015).
To summarize, the Board has the right to come to different findings, conclusions,
and decisions than those of the ALJ. What matters is that the Board's determinations are
supported by substantial evidence. "This court grants great deference to an agency's
findings, and will uphold them if they are 'supported by substantial evidence when
viewed in light of the whole record before the court."' Alber/sons, Inc. v. Department of
Employment Sec., 854 P.2d 570, 574 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citations omitted). In the
present case, the Board's reasoning, conclusions, and decision are all supported by
substantial evidence.
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~

CONCLUSION
This Court should find the Petitioner, FBAC, failed to proffer sufficient legal
evidence competent in a court of law to find the UPD officers were engaged in an
independently established business. The law presumes the officers are employees unless
proven otherwise by FBAC. Since FBAC failed to proffer sufficient evidence to rebut
this presumption, this Court should find the Board's conclusion that the UPD officers
(j

performed services for FBAC, constituting employment, was reasonable and rational.
For these reasons, this Court should uphold the Board's decision.
Respectfully submitted this

1t~ day of June, 2017.

A4

NATHAN R. WHITE #14365
Attorney for Respondent
Workforce Appeals Board
Department of Workforce Services
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ADDENDUM A
35A-4-204 Definition of employment.

~

(1) Subject to the other provisions of this section, "employment" means any service
performed for wages or under any contract of hire, whether written or oral, express or
implied, including service in interstate commerce, and service as an officer of a
corporation.
(2) "Employment" includes an individual's entire service performed within or both
within and without this state if one of Subsections (2)(a) through (k) is satisfied.
(a) The service is localized in this state. Service is localized within this state if:
(i) the service is performed entirely within the state; or
(ii) the service is performed both within and without the state, but the service
performed without the state is incidental to the individual's service within the
state, for example, is temporary or transitory in nature or consists of isolated
transactions.
(b) (i) The service is not localized in any state but some of the service is performed in
this state and the individual's base of operations, or, ifthere is no base of
operations, the place from which the service is directed or controlled, is in this
state; or
(ii) the individual's base of operations or place from which the service is directed
or controlled is not in any state in which some part of the service is performed,
but the individual's residence is in this state.
(c)(i)(A) The service is performed entirely outside this state and is not localized in
any state;
(B) the worker is one of a class of employees who are required to travel outside
this state in performance of their duties; and
(C)(I) the base of operations is in this state; or
(II) if there is no base of operations, the place from which the service is
directed or controlled is in this state.
(ii) Services covered by an election under Subsection 35A-4-310(3), and services
covered by an arrangement under Section 35A-4-106 between the division and the
agency charged with the administration of any other state or federal
unemployment compensation law, under which all services performed by an
individual for an employing unit are considered to be performed entirely within
this state, are considered to be employment if the division has approved an
election of the employing unit for whom the services are performed, under which
the entire service of the individual during the period covered by the election is
considered to be insured work.
(d)(i) The service is performed in the employ of the state, a county, city, town, school
district, or other political subdivision of the state, or in the employ of an Indian tribe
or tribal unit or an instrumentality of any one or more of the foregoing which is
wholly owned by the state or one of its political subdivisions or Indian tribes or tribal
units if:
(A) the service is excluded from employment as defined in the Federal
Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. 3306(c)(7);
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ADDENDUM A
(B) the service is not excluded from employment by Section 35A-4-205; and
(C) as to any county, city, town, school district, or political subdivision of this
state, or an instrumentality of the same or Indian tribes or tribal units, that
service is either:
(I) required to be treated as covered employment as a condition of eligibility
of employers in this state for Federal Unemployment Tax Act employer tax
credit;
(II) required to be treated as covered employment by any other requirement
of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, as amended; or
(Ill) not required to be treated as covered employment by any requirement
of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, but coverage of the service is elected
by a majority of the members of the governing body of the political
subdivision or instrumentality or tribal unit in accordance with Section
35A-4-310.
(ii) Benefits paid on the basis of service performed in the employ of this state shall
be financed by payments to the division instead of contributions in the manner and
amounts prescribed by Subsections 35A-4-311(2)(a) and (4).
(iii) Benefits paid on the basis of service performed in the employ of any other
governmental entity or tribal unit described in this Subsection (2) shall be financed
by payments to the division in the manner and amount prescribed by the applicable
provisions of Section 3 5A-4-3 l 1.
(e) The service is performed by an individual in the employ of a religious, charitable,
educational, or other organization, but only if:
(i) the service is excluded from employment as defined in the Federal
Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. 3306(c)(8), solely by reason of Section
3306(c)(8) of that act; and
(ii) the organization had four or more individuals in employment for some portion of
a day in each of 20 different weeks, whether or not the weeks were consecutive,
within either the current or preceding calendar year, regardless of whether they were
employed at the same moment of time.
(t)(i) The service is performed outside the United States, except in Canada, in the
employ of an American employer, other than service that is considered employment
under the provisions of this Subsection (2) or the parallel provisions of another
state's law if:
(A) the employer's principal place of business in the United States is located in
this state;
(B) the employer has no place of business in the United States but is:
(I) an individual who is a resident of this state;
(II) a corporation that is organized under the laws of this state; or
(Ill) a partnership or trust in which the number of partners or trustees who are
residents of this state is greater than the number who are residents of any one
other state; or
(C) none of the criteria of Subsections (2)(t)(i)(A) and (B) is met but:
{I) the employer has elected coverage in this state; or
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(II) the employer fails to elect coverage in any state and the individual has filed
a claim for benefits based on that service under the law of this state.
(ii) "American employer" for purposes of this Subsection (2) means a person who is:
(A) an individual who is a resident of the United States;
(B) a partnership if 2/3 or more of the partners are residents of the United States;
(C) a trust if all of the trustees are residents of the United States;
(D) a corporation organized under the laws of the United States or of any state;
(E) a limited liability company organized under the laws of the United States or
of a state;
(F) a limited liability partnership organized under the laws of the United States
or of any state; or
(G) a joint venture if 2/3 or more of the members are individuals, partnerships,
corporations, limited liability companies, or limited liability partnerships that
qualify as American employers.
(g) The service is performed:
(i) by an officer or member of the crew of an American vessel on or in connection
with the vessel; and
(ii) the operating office from which the operations of the vessel, operating on
navigable waters within, or within and without, the United States, is ordinarily and
regularly supervised, managed, directed, and controlled within this state.
(h) A tax with respect to the service in this state is required to be paid under any federal
law imposing a tax against which credit may be taken for contributions required to be
paid into a state unemployment fund or that, as a condition for full tax credit against
the tax imposed by the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, is required to be covered
under this chapter.
(i)(i) Notwithstanding Subsection 35A-4-205(l)(p), the service is performed:
(A) as an agent-driver or commission-driver engaged in distributing meat
products, vegetable products, fruit products, bakery products, beverages other
than milk, or laundry or dry cleaning services, for the driver's principal; or
(B) as a traveling or city salesman, other than as an agent-driver or
commission-driver, engaged on a full-time basis in the solicitation on behalf of
and the transmission to the salesman's principal, except for sideline sales
activities on behalf of some other person, of orders from wholesalers, retailers,
contractors, or operators of hotels, restaurants, or other similar establishments for
merchandise for resale or supplies for use in their business operations.
(ii) The term "employment" as used in this Subsection (2) includes services
described in Subsection (2)(i)(i) performed only if:
(A) the contract of service contemplates that substantially all of the services are
to be performed personally by the individual;
(B) the individual does not have a substantial investment in facilities used in
connection with the performance of the services other than in facilities for
transportation; and
(C) the services are not in the nature of a single transaction that is not part of a
continuing relationship with the person for whom the services are performed.
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G) The service is performed by an individual in agricultural labor as defined in Section
35A-4-206.
(k) The service is domestic service performed in a private home, local college club, or
local chapter of a college fraternity or sorority performed for a person who paid cash
remuneration of $1,000 or more during any calendar quarter in either the current
calendar year or the preceding calendar year to individuals employed in the domestic
service.
(3) Services performed by an individual for wages or under any contract of hire, written
or oral, express or implied, are considered to be employment subject to this chapter,
unless it is shown to the satisfaction of the division that:
(a) the individual is customarily engaged in an independently established trade,
occupation, profession, or business of the same nature as that involved in the contract
of hire for services; and
(b) the individual has been and will continue to be free from control or direction over
the means of performance of those services, both under the individual's contract of hire
and in fact.
(4) If an employer, consistent with a prior declaratory ruling or other formal
determination by the division, has treated an individual as independently established and
it is later determined that the individual is in fact an employee, the department may by
rule provide for waiver of the employer's retroactive liability for contributions with
respect to wages paid to the individual prior to the date of the division's later
determination, except to the extent the individual has filed a claim for benefits.
Amended by Chapter 22, 2006 General Session
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35A-4-508 Review of decision or determination by division -- Administrative law
judge -- Division of adjudication -- Workforce Appeals Board -- Judicial review by
Court of Appeals -- Exclusive procedure.
(1 )(a) A review of a decision or determination involving contribution liability or
applications for refund of contributions shall be made by the division in accordance
with the provisions of this chapter.
(b) The division in conducting the review may in its discretion:
(i) refer the matter to an administrative law judge;
(ii) decide the application for review on the basis of any facts and information as
may be obtained; or
(iii) hear argument or hold an informal hearing to secure further facts.
(c) After the review, notice of the decision shall be given to the employing unit.
(d) The decision made pursuant to the review is the final decision of the division
unless, within 10 days after the date of notification or mailing of the decision, a
further appeal is initiated under the provisions of this section.
(2)(a) Within 10 days after the mailing or personal delivery of a notice of a determination
or decision rendered following a review under Subsection ( 1), an employing unit may
appeal to the Division of Adjudication by filing a notice of appeal.
(b) The administrative law judge shall give notice of the pendency of the appeal to the
division and any parties entitled to notice as provided by department rule. The
administrative law judge shall receive into the record of the appeal any documents or
other records provided by the division, and may obtain or request any additional
documents or records held by the division or any of the parties that the administrative
law judge considers relevant to a proper determination of the appeal.
(c) After affording the parties reasonable opportunity for a fair hearing, the
administrative law judge shall make findings and conclusions and on that basis affirm,
modify, or reverse the determination of the division.
(d) The parties and the division shall be promptly notified of the administrative law
judge's decision and furnished a copy of the decision and findings.
( e) The decision of the administrative law judge is considered to be a final order of the
department unless within 30 days after the date the decision of the administrative law
judge is issued further appeal is initiated under this section and Chapter 1, Part 3,
Adjudicative Proceedings.
(3)(a) The director of the Division of Adjudication shall assign an impartial, salaried
administrative law judge selected in accordance with Subsection 35A-4-502(4)(a) to
hear and decide referrals or appeals relating to claims for benefits or to make
decisions affecting employing units under this chapter.
(b) All records on appeals shall be maintained in the offices of the Division of
Adjudication. The records shall include an appeal docket showing the receipt and
disposition of the appeals on review.
(4) The Workforce Appeals Board may review and decide an appeal from a decision of
an administrative law judge issued under this chapter.
(5)(a) The manner in which disputed matters are presented, the reports required from the
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claimant and employing units, and the conduct of hearings and appeals shall be in
accordance with rules prescribed by the department for determining the rights of the
parties, whether or not the rules conform to common-law or statutory rules of
evidence and other technical rules of procedure.
(b) When the same or substantially similar evidence is relevant and material to the
matters in issue in more than one proceeding, the same time and place for considering
each matter may be fixed, hearings jointly conducted, a single record of the
proceedings made, and evidence introduced with respect to one proceeding
considered as introduced in the others, if in the judgment of the administrative law
judge having jurisdiction of the proceedings, the consolidation would not be
prejudicial to any party.
(6)(a) Except for reconsideration of any determination under Subsection 35A-4-406(2),
any right, fact, or matter in issue, directly passed upon or necessarily involved in a
determination or redetermination that has become final, or in a decision on appeal
under this section that has become final, is conclusive for all the purposes of this
chapter as between the division, the claimant, and all employing units that had notice
of the determination, redetermination, or decision. Subject to appeal proceedings and
judicial review as provided in this section, any determination, redetermination, or
decision as to rights to benefits is conclusive for all the purposes of this chapter and is
not subject to collateral attack by any employing unit, irrespective of notice.
(b) Any findings of fact or law, judgment, conclusion, or final order made by an
unemployment insurance hearing officer, administrative law judge, or any person with
the authority to make findings of fact or law in any action or proceeding before the
unemployment insurance appeals tribunal, is not conclusive or binding in any separate
or subsequent action or proceeding, between an individual and the individual's
present or prior employer, brought before an arbitrator, court, or judge of this state or
the United States, regardless of whether the prior action was between the same or
related parties or involved the same facts.
(7)(a) Any decision in the absence of an appeal as provided becomes final upon issuance
and judicial review may be permitted only after any party claiming to be aggrieved
has exhausted the party's remedies before the department as provided by this chapter.
(b) The division is a party to any judicial action involving any decisions and shall be
represented in the judicial action by any qualified attorney employed by the
department and designated by it for that purpose or at the division's request by the
attorney general.
(8)(a) Within 30 days after the decision of the Workforce Appeals Board is issued, any
aggrieved party may secure judicial review by commencing an action in the court of
appeals against the Workforce Appeals Board for the review of its decision, in which
action any other party to the proceeding before the Workforce Appeals Board shall be
made a defendant.
(b) In that action a petition, that shall state the grounds upon which a review is sought,
shall be served upon the Workforce Appeals Board or upon that person the Workforce
Appeals Board designates. This service is considered completed service on all
parties but there shall be left with the party served as many copies of the petition as
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there are defendants and the Workforce Appeals Board shall mail one copy to each
defendant.
(c) With its answer, the Workforce Appeals Board shall certify and file with the court
all documents and papers and a transcript of all testimony taken in the matter together
with its findings of fact and decision, in accordance with the requirements of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
(d) The Workforce Appeals Board may certify to the court questions of law involved
in any decision by the board.
(e) In any judicial proceeding under this section, the findings of the Workforce
Appeals Board as to the facts, if supported by evidence, are conclusive and the
jurisdiction of the court is confined to questions of law.
(f) It is not necessary in any judicial proceeding under this section to enter exceptions
to the rulings of the division, an administrative law judge, Workforce Appeals Board
and no bond is required for entering the appeal.
(g) Upon final determination of the judicial proceeding, the division shall enter an
order in accordance with the determination. In no event may a petition for judicial
review act as a supersedeas.
(9) The procedure provided for hearings and decisions with respect to any decision or
determination of the division affecting claimants or employing units under this chapter is
the sole and exclusive procedure notwithstanding any other provision of this title.
Amended by Chapter 13, 1998 General Session

~
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63G-4-403 Judicial review -- Formal adjudicative proceedings.
(I) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to
review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.
(2)(a) To seekjudicial review of final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative
proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of agency action with the
appropriate appellate court in the form required by the appellate rules of the
appropriate appellate court.
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern all additional
filings and proceedings in the appellate court.
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial review of
formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
except that:
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, summarize, or
organize the record;
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and copies for the
record:
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or
organize the record; or
(ii) according to any other provision of law.
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's record, it
determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any
of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action is based, is
unconstitutional on its face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or
has failed to follow prescribed procedure;
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a
decision-making body or were subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the
agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the
whole record before the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the
inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational
basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3 82, 2008 General Session
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R994-204-303. Factors for Determining Independent Contractor Status.
Services will be excluded under Section 35A-4-204 if the service meets the
requirements of this rule. Special scrutiny of the facts is required to assure that
the form of a service relationship does not obscure its substance, that is, whether
the worker is independently established in a like trade, occupation, profession or
business and is free from control and direction. The factors listed in subsections
R994-204-303(l)(b) and R994-204-303(2)(b) of this section are intended only as
aids in the analysis of the facts of each case. The degree of importance of each
factor varies depending on the service and the factual context in which it is
performed. Additionally, some factors do not apply to certain services and,
therefore, should not be considered.
(I)
Independently Established.
(a) An individual will be considered customarily engaged in an
independently established trade, occupation, profession, or business if the
individual is, at the time the service is performed, regularly engaged in a trade,
occupation, profession, or business of the same nature as the service
performed, and the trade, occupation, profession, or business is established
independently of the alleged employer. In other words, an independently
established trade, occupation, profession, or business is created and exists apart
from a relationship with a particular employer and does not depend on a
relationship with any one employer for its continued existence.
(b) The following factors, if applicable, will determine whether a worker
is customarily engaged in an independently established trade or business:
(i) Separate Place of Business. The worker has a place of business
separate from that of the employer.
(ii) Tools and Equipment. The worker has a substantial investment in
the tools, equipment, or facilities customarily required to perform the services.
However, "tools of the trade" used by certain trades or crafts do not necessarily
demonstrate independence.
(iii) Other Clients. The worker regularly performs services of the
same nature for other customers or clients and is not required to work
exclusively for one employer.
(iv) Profit or Loss. The worker can realize a profit or risks a loss from
expenses and debts incurred through an independently established business
activity.
(v) Advertising. The worker advertises services in telephone
directories, newspapers, magazines, the Internet, or by other methods clearly
demonstrating an effort to generate business.
(vi) Licenses. The worker has obtained any required and customary
business, trade, or professional licenses.
(vii) Business Records and Tax Forms. The worker maintains records
or documents that validate expenses, business asset valuation or income earned
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so he or she may file self-employment and other business tax forms with the
Internal Revenue Service and other agencies.
(c) If an employer proves to the satisfaction of the Department that the worker is
customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession or
business of the same nature as the service in question, there will be a rebuttable
presumption that the employer did not have the right of or exercise direction or
control over the service.
(2)
Control and Direction.
(a) When an employer retains the right to control and direct the
performance of a service, or actually exercises control and direction over the
worker who performs the service, not only as to the result to be accomplished
by the work but also as to the manner and means by which that result is to be
accomplished, the worker is an employee of the employer for the purposes of
the Act.
(b) The following factors, if applicable, will be used as aids in
determining whether an employer has the right of or exercises control and
direction over the service of a worker:
(i) Instructions. A worker who is required to comply with other
persons' instructions about how the service is to be performed is ordinarily an
employee. This factor is present if the employer for whom the service is
performed has the right to require compliance with the instructions.
(ii) Training. Training a worker by requiring or expecting an
experienced person to work with the worker, by corresponding with the
worker, by requiring the worker to attend meetings, or by using other methods,
indicates that the employer for whom the service is performed expects the
service to be performed in a particular method or manner.
(iii) Pace or Sequence. A requirement that the service must be
provided at a pace or ordered sequence of duties imposed by the employer
indicates control or direction. The coordinating and scheduling of the services
of more than one worker does not indicate control and direction.
(iv) Work on Employer's Premises. A requirement that the service be
performed on the employer's premises indicates that the employer for whom
the service is performed has retained a right to supervise and oversee the
manner in which the service is performed, especially if the service could be
performed elsewhere.
(v) Personal Service. A requirement that the service must be
performed personally and may not be assigned to others indicates the right to
control or direct the manner in which the work is performed.
(vi) Continuous Relationship. A continuous service relationship
between the worker and the employer indicates that an employer-employee
relationship exists. A continuous relationship may exist where work is
performed regularly or at frequently recurring although irregular intervals. A
continuous relationship does not exist where the worker is contracted to
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complete specifically identified projects, even though the service relationship
may extend over a significant period of time.
(vii) Set Hours of Work. The establishment of set hours or a specific
number of hours of work by the employer indicates control.
(viii)Method of Payment. Payment by the hour, week, or month points
to an employer-employee relationship, provided that this method of payment is
not just a convenient way of paying progress billings as part of a fixed price
agreed upon as the cost of a job. Control may also exist when the employer
determines the method of payment.

Date of Enactment or Last Substantive Amendment
July 1, 2007
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R994-508-109.

Hearing Procedures.

(7) The evidentiary standard for ALJ decisions, except in cases of
fraud, is a preponderance of the evidence. Preponderance means evidence
which is of greater weight or more convincing than the evidence which is
offered in opposition to it; that is, evidence which as a whole shows that the
fact sought to be proved is more probable than not. The evidentiary
standard for determining claimant fraud is clear and convincing evidence.
Clear and convincing is a higher standard than preponderance of the
evidence and means that the allegations of fraud are highly probable.

Date of Enactment or Last Substantive Amendment
May 30, 2017

~
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R994-508-111.

Evidence, Including Hearsay Evidence.

(4) Findings of fact cannot be based exclusively on hearsay evidence
unless that evidence is admissible under the Utah Rules of Evidence. All
findings must be supported by a residuum of legal evidence competent in a court
of law.

Date of Enactment or Last Substantive Amendment
May 30, 2017

~

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I

•

~ADDENDUM B

~

Utah Depirtmtnt of Workforce Services
Unemployment Contrlb-utlon•
Audit ConQIUfion Report

Is the employer mainfaining proper and adequate records?.
Prepare Fom1 70?
Comments
Quarters Audfted:
B
Comments:
Differences

Audit lime: ·

95 Hours

Audit-·Results Discussed With;

Oficer and Dsslgnmsd Rep

.

.

I

I

·I

•

,1-0025u.o

·.

FUR BREEDERS AGRICULTURALCOOPERATlve .
3191.2()16
Yes

No

Action

Addiopal
Requimf:
Onraff Aucfrt Comments:

Thie is a 1099 audtt of an animal feed and fur bearer coopeTlidV&. The calendar
year 2014 and 2016 was audited,
The business is registered as a co~oration and hi currsntly a~ivs and in good
standing with the Utah Department ~C0mmerce.
·
.

Toa employer's financial and payroll records were examined thru 4th quarter gf
2015 ta vertry tD1al and subject wages which were 1'8ported to ~ate unemployment
lneurance with only roundfng differences. The ~orporatt, Dflice('s Dale Christensen
and Christopher Falco received and reported wa98s above thrJta>table wage base,

Per examination Qf the employers cha ck register there were muttiple unreported
workers found In the.yea112014 & 2015. - Sae sumrnal)' diebwrsement for details.
Fort y--three 1C89's war a issued. Sixteen were 9>Ccluded and twentyrseven ware
Included. • See 1099 worksheet for details.
·
Officer Christopher Falco has not signed the audit report due '1 disagreeing with
the audit: maUed the audit report end deterrni{tation lefter axpl~inlng·the de1aDed
a\Jad findings antt their appeal rights.

Total adjustments 10 the account created a recer,able of 563478. Employer wiD pay
after the appeal has been decided if the department pre1alls.
Verified there are no changes to the employer's computed°ratl! for 2016. Mailed lo
the employer the "Resources for Utah Employers• 'information.

Acopy of the audit report and determination letter ms been scanned into this aulflt.
Ai;tions Taken:

li

CoU ection Efforts:

Othar

UT CMS T1'P v5,42,D,, 004

~
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. ADDENDUM B·
FORM B1

3/9~16

Utah Department of Wortfo~e se·rvlces
Name;

FUR BREECE.RS AGRICULTURAL

DBA: ·
Address:

Employer ID:
Auditor Name:

8700 S700W

Audit Typs:
UT

SANDY

4-002614-0:
MARKP~~SON
Unemp1oyrrient lnsuran~e

84070-2620

I have reviewed this ~ort and agree that H covers all ths unfts
1,mdsrthe abDVB reglstration number. Tc the best of my
knowfedga, I haw fumi&hed true and complete records to the
a\lditor. I understand this audtt wiR bee oms final in fifteen daya

Contribution

556.26
76.52

lnterast
Penalty
NR Due·

unleas appealed In wmlng.

.o.oo
0.[D

TOTAL DUE,
Total Payment Received

~ned:

832.7B
0.00

---,---------- Title: ----------- Data: ------

APPEAL PROCEDURE: MY appaal must be ir, writing within flfte~ days from tho d;ta of'this repcirt. Appeals rmist state
the grounds for rmew, the relisfruquested, and the date the appeal Is mailed. Mail to: Department ofWorkforce

Services,.Field Audit, P.O. Box45238 Saft ~ke Ctty, Utah 84145-0268

.

.

Audit Year. 2014
QTR1

QTR2
421,664
35,SCB

Reported Total Wages
Reported Excess Wages

450.782

Reported Subje~ Wages
PayroU Adjustments

450,782
1,115

366,056

EXte$S

a

0

_Unreported Wages

E>ccees
: VarifiedTotalWagas
Verified Excess Wages
Verified Subject Wage&
Rate

Rtported Contribution Due

Verified Contribution Due
Net Contnbu1hm Due
.. Interest Due
Penalty Due
Tata! Due

a
.

7,132

0

15,.Q}
D
438.4B4

0
459,183
0.007
3,155.47
3,214.32
58.65
13.54
0.CD
7233

35,608
402.876

Q1R4

TOTAL

602,821
264,[J23

539,832
447~66
91,866

2,014,799

338.798
1,700
3,826
11,640
D
616,161
~,848

1.400

. 459,189

QTR3

34B.313

0.007

0.007

2,702.39
2,820.13
117.74
23.55
0,00
141.29

2,371.·ss

747 ~97
1,267,502.
5.750
5,100
47,002
D
2,067,~1
752;397
1,316,154
0,000
8,872.51
9,200.07

1,l75

1,f5
12~10
jO
553,1:17
448~41
104,~76

0.'37
seres
I

2,438.18
SB.SJ
11.32
O.[JJ

733~43

7732

1~.02
I

91137
I

1~65

oioo

•

333.55
61.06
0.00
394.62

• Interest creatts dJsp1aved era used to c1f9a !merest asse1>sed In other quarters. AnyremalnlllJ Interest cfedft caMot be rerunded nor
used to reduce Contributions due per 35A-4-306(5)(a) cf1he Utah Employment securttt Act.
:
Note: Failure ta compt,Wlth or contact owe co~emlng the tctal due per autmffDCflngs may result In our shann11 the aggregate data
ttom this audltwl1h the U6 Department ofl..ebor, Wage and Hour DMsJon. 35A-4-312 ts) (p)
UT Dt$ iN' V.5,42.0.'l004
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FORM 81

Utah Department of Workforce Sarvlces
Audit Yean 2615
QTR1

QTR2

QTR3

.Reportsd Excess Wases
Reported Subject Wages
Payroll Adjustments

444,501
0
-4.44,501
1,275

444,041
39,442
404.599

632.282
263.494

1.400

725

Exca&Er

a

D

2,BI!i

10,9'20

12,165

11,700
0
644lrJl
258,299

Repart&d Tot al Wages

Unrepvrted Wages
Exces~
Verified Total Wage~
Verified E:wcess Wages
Verified SUbject Wages
Rate

Reported Contribution Due
Verifisd Contribution Cue
Nat Contribution Due
• Intel'Bst Due
Penalty Due
Total Oue

a

0

456,SSS

451,Bts

0

39,442
416,164
0.005

466,696

D.005
2,222:so
2,283.48

60.98
6.71
0.00
ol.69

2,CI23.CD
2,090.62
67.82
· 6.~3
0.00
7.3.25

378,768

388.40B

0.005
1.893.94
1,94204
48.10

QTR4
641 ,3~9

612,193

129,1?6
115D

,;,o
9, ,;,o

10
660,6;79
512.363
1~.316
0.005
645~78

·ss,.sa
45~60

2.40

o:s2

0.00
50.5)

0.00
J\S.72

TOTAL·

2,162,173
805,129
1~,044
3,550
2,975
43,965
0
2,2CB,6SB
80B 11~
1,401,594
Q.000
6,785.22
7,007.92
222.70
15.46
0.00
238.16

\JTOV'S TAPv.5.42.0,1004

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Exhibit: 39

71

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF WORICFORCE·SERVICES
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE .. CON'r~U11ONS
AB'RST, ~'IIDN OF EMPLOYMENI'. ·
Mardi,, 2011

FMC
8700S700W
SAIOi tJr 84070-2520

Doar Chris Fa~o.

-An a~dit was coJ1dumd. 011 l'BAC and I hve sent to. yoa jho a.udit findha, roprding tho 1bDowing in4Mdvall who did
· not moot tha piovfslons of the· Q'tah Smploya:aont Soovritf Aot. Thit ~uor is a fi>rmal d~tamumtio11 ofa17 mdms- on
·~ -:., .. th9 aad.it tbat was comp=tod O!I your account i>r t;bt yoar 1014 thro 4th quarter otZ015, Dwms tho cumiu~don of
:-~- ·thO·RDljlNi' It WU ~UDd 11M11 twentj,cight ~f$b• WO'rtors baw boo11 determined lD ba'fo' pormnood a ,orsonal aorvto
··mr PBAC mad reoolvo<I l'Ol:RUDOrl.~D basod UJ)Oll that IOfflQG which irromploymcnt subject to tbe UUh ~loymnt .. :
:S,o~lldf° Act.

·

no ii Bow ms workors, Jason Applaman, 'llcbanl Bf&hop, Chris Christonaoat, lee.ob Cutright, Hoathcrlyn Drips, Susan
Egbert, Jato Elsasser, Scott~n, Mattbow lbritage, Siop&en Higham. Brueo Hantmgton, Riobard 1onren. J'oao & .
R.ay Lope~ Kylo Lowther, Bryu Ma4aon. MlchaeJM■,a, Ange& Potts, Nioholas Jhmro, Tyl,r, R.thsnan, Juaa .
St11fth, X ovin SpDD".r, ltflll. Wat10n, 1crcsJ Wilson, Za.obary Bonoh, Bm Brolthctad, Bru l>m a~ Jib Ba•11011.
w~re lound to &ave received paynientis whfab uo eubjecl to die Utth Emplo)'Dtent Snarity Aot.
Bruco H'UDtfnB(Dn. Brad Dmt, Brian Broadhoad, Ryan W11lo11, Kyle Lowther, Zachary Bonoh, Matthow. Bert.ago~
Sec=urity Offiecr'a- Perrol'lcw oCtbcs stalUB qucseiozmairc'1 tho so~cµit)'·omco;.. db! llOt advortls11 thoir 11trVicts,
. wortcd on I replu ba~, au&l WGro reqmd to w~it s;hcd~d h~tmt ud paid 8JJ boaii, wap tar tho scn:~s·
provid~d, Itha1 'b~aa do~faed'fliatBruao a•p;i·Doimls Roca, Drid Durr, Brin B~6dhoad·, 1.~ Watson.
Kylo Lowthoi, Zlobary Bach, Matchtw Horitagc wore not kdopm,dontly ·o,tal>lisbod in thalr own buliDen and did
not moot tbo provisions of Ill mdopcmdent coutrac~r~
;

:

t

•

•

•,v. .- •

I

•

•

•

,

•

••

..

•

•

•

•

)~.-:: • ADSOJki P-oui. Bryait..Macfao.n. PJ!Ht C~ist~uoi,, ~oaU1crJ;ru Prlpa, Jacob Cutright. Jake BJsuaer, 1110n Applomq.
~J'a~f.ti.~~W,.. J,rim;.'-~~o.a., i~~-~OZ.:~~~ ~~i}c,~, M~hiol ~ay•, Nb1a91'& le,~, Ra,y
~~t• ·B•&&,i•iliohanl Jonscst ScottR:anicii, sa,·.uwen'ilid Ty~ tuunj.ta:·s:ooudJ Officor1- NQ:e\>WQpa wit .. : ,
.. .
pravkld bJ the cmpk>7cror tho iec11rity cftlcer'1 ~ verify dloy are mdopendoa.tly eatablisbod "the~ own b1J$ilcss~
utL&le to &id advcrfbins on the yollow papa ~r mternct·dfre~ory or an aotife ~ o ID tha n,partmant of
Commorcis orDepai"tmobt nfPtafossionalLteusilg. ll.ctarmlaod Oio $ocmiy<)ffioors did hOt moot tho provisktu, of'

J•

~.P.~

,: . ·

an indopond<tal comractor, •

S,i1an Egbert:Cloaning 1c~•- No cvfci~noo was pravidod by tho ompbyer or Mrs, Egbert to vority sho •
indepondonti, oa1ab&hod hi her own buamora, Wllblo to &nd advcrtsing on tho yDBow p1go1 fuctorr or Jc tho
Dcpatmoat o!Commcrce. Determined Mn. Eg:btrt did notmoui tho proyisi:u11 ofan indopeJtf tnt oomractor,
'
110 l:BSt·300 Saith • Sit lm City, Utab IKUl
· 801-526-9?3! • artal tree aao 222-2957, FAX BD1-52HD6 •Relay utah 111
Spnh b,lay ~ 1-888-*,!161 • £qua[0ppCHtunly ~ • Jobs,utah.gov
•

I

t

.: •

•

•• •

• ' • .. I

~• •

t t
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ADDENDUM. B

. • Slophoa Blgh1a: Lawn oan is~,:,_ hr n ~ or~ l1atur qu~IIIIU't Mr. 1111),am only wtrt:o~ lbr FBAC
perfomrins lawn ean service& as a oontrf,ctor ind did uotadvertllc his services ind pcdomaod work on a rogu!ar
barll. ~ the employer provldod Cho lawn mower and tb'o ga1. It h1t1 boon detcrmfnod that Sitp~n Hfgbcm w..a not
izidopomicntly eata&&Jsod ~his owu buslnosa.ud did not mioUhe provilioaa !)!n ln1!opGncl~nt~oitraetqr.
J;Jettnniud Mr. B!ghaa did·not mcos ~o provfsbn1 ofan fndoj,o~doDt contn~r.
j
.
I
I bavo lan,tfgated tho working roladoll$hfp bDtwoon your orgnization amt the tw011l)'•ofght wflrbr, m~ncd m l1tis
dG1a1minatiu1 ttter. This lotter.1brmally sta1H myfi)diup based DD fni>nnatiDa pro\lfdod &)' the, pmp~craad Shil,
ooJJtractDn, I hive detormfaod fhat 1hc CWearty•ofgltt wotkcn pcd,rmecl a p1rsonal aervlco fbr F~A C and reoolved
romutJombn baaod' 'Dpo11 that acrvlc~ that w11 oovorod employincnt. Tho l>Dow.tng sections of lie Utab Bmpfoym;Dt
Booority A.ct wore uaod In making ,IPY dotennlutbn.
· · •
· /•
.

5edfon 3SA+204, SSA-+208 end 3SA+204{3) riehe UlBh Employment Sed.rily Id. pt'O\lde:
204 ,•• "employment' me'zsns arr,semce performed tor wags or under any c:ontract: of NA,, whether wrRten or
oral, express or fm?led, l~Lldlng serke In Interstate mnmerce, and seMCe as an officer of a corporation.
208 ~ means wages as omnU)' deffned bi/ Section 3306(b), InlBmal Revenue Code Of l9B5 whfch sta,es
Wages m,ans all remtnntlQn fbr enipt~ frdUdlng the cash ~ue rl all ~ (mdudlng beneffts)
paid 1n anv medhm otte' lhan Q$fl, ••
201(3) Services performed by an tndMduat for wages or um eny contract orhlre, written or aral, e,cpress or
lmplled, are amsfdered to be em~ett 6lbJect mttws ch~, unless It Is shown tD the Sltisfad1on of 1he
dMsfanthat:
.

{a) t h e ~ Is ~ Y engaged rn an ~eslabll5hed trade, occ:up1Jtlon, profe5Sfon, « business .
of1he ~ nat\n as that lnwlved In the mntrad: cf tire for serws; and
.
.
(b) the lndMdual ha$ been and wffl crinue to l?e fR!e tiom con1rOf and dlrectton owr lhe mesw of perfcnna~
of tflDSie services, both enter the lndMduar.s ~ o f tire and In ratt
•

I

•

•

•

1l1e ronowtng ~ are amstdered to de1ennlne If~ ~ I ls o.stx,mm1fy~ tn an.Jndepencfenffy.tmttlshed
trade, pccupatton, rrc,fesslon, or·bustness. The~ rl Importance of eath fador:aies qepen;11ng·00 tile accupaUon an:,
the l'adJJal anmt In~ the~ rs pcrfcnned. Some faam do not apply to ~ln OQ."UPations and therefore should

not be~ anywelght.

I

Sepaiate.Place of lus1l'less:. The wcrta- has a place ·r1 busln!5s separate rrom itst of the employer,

· flNDUG; lh&vo JlO c\'idcKo praviclo.d by dia workers onmployor1hattheyhavo thafrown pleca of
business.

...

'

'RJols aml-Bpalpmsnt .. The worker has e SU.bstantfal ln\es\ment ln the toots, equipment; or fadDties ~ J y
requred to ptrftmn 1he services. t-towewr, ioots d lhe 1radd' used by certain trades or crafts do not necessatUy
demomtrale lndeperldei ace.
FINDINGS: Per ~v!ow ofthe atuua qaoath,JLllU't lbr Mr. H,Jg_ham, the cmpfoyor provkl"d tho kwn mowor and
gas 1o pori,rm the 1erv~os. P~r revi;w ortho siatm qucstiozmma tom tho 1ocvrlty officers, itaoy provldocf
dlok own (Do ls and oqufpmeot

Othar Qentl • The worf<er regularly performs sel'\tces of the seme JEture for other ~ or dim ani:f ls
not required tD wor1C edusfvelv fur one emplO)lel',
140 eaat300 Sa\ttt • Sit 1Ue Cl;\', utah84W
881-52H23S • artal "1es 800 222-2851 • FAX 801-526-9236 • R.efay utah 711

S'panG11Relay~1-n&-346-3162•EqualOppartunty~•J,'bs.~giw
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.

flNDlNGS: T~ workot1 woro not ~airod to work ex~!J~lvoly fi:ir tbo ~mployor altbough t.hcro waa no
informatfoa. or ovidnco provided by tho cmploy~r or e<Jtltracinrto verify that Ito kind sorvloos were
porlormcd far o1bcr c;!fonta aa lnd~pe~dent oootr~ctoril pro_vldmg abtJar aorvfoo,.
Proll: ar Lou• The wcricer can mhze a profftor risks a loss from eJqJerses and debts lnatred 1tlroulf, an
Independently estaljfshed business ndMty.
,

FINtlJS: ~is workers w~re not Iu a p0altio1J to ;oallzD I profit or niff&r a b11 doing this ~e ofwork, They
vroro ~•id a fixed amoUllt s~t by tho 00ntr1cior•1 empbyor aiid agreed ap~n for th~ir

sa10,.

i·

. Advertlsfng • The wot1cer adver'ffsa serw:es In telepfme c11reda1es, rewspapers, ·magazines, Che Wernet, or·by
other methods dearfy demanstmlng an effort to generate lxsness.
.
FINDINGS: I oould noc':find ovldo~e la 1ho tclephono cUrootar~1 or the in~met that the workers aclvertlsod their
serv~o• as ladcpoiidcm ooutra~tors.
·

License • 111e wort<er has obtained any reqttred and cusmmary Mfness, trade, or pr1>fessland llcense5.
FJNDINCo: I 001114 nat fiml ,vidonto in tho DepartaiontofProfesirfonalLiccufng that the workm hod an acttvo
tradt or prafo11fonal &1uc.
·
Basiless Tax fbnm • The worker malntmns remrds or dccumera that valldate e>cpE!l'WeS, tislness met
vmuatton or Jna,me earned so he or
mayflle seJf~playmellt and other business mx forms with the In1ema1
ReWl1l8 Serke and other~
.
.
FiNDE: Tho workcn h&ve to mo a Schoclulo C•Sclf'Bmplo7JDcnt TIX Po~ Thi& Ja~tqr daea not bave
1lpfflcan1 wefJfit ID my dotcl'Jllbiatio1. duo to the fut thC)' havo to le a s~hodu!D C whon 1 109~ la rocolvod..

n

The fcftowlng fad0rs are CQ'ISldared ta def2rmlne 1f an !ndMdual fs t.nder control or dlredfon:
Jnstractlons • A woriler who ~ reqwed to mmply wHh other persors' tnstrudSorys about how the service Is to be
performed Is ~narlly an empbyee. 1hfs facmr Js present ff the emp10'j81' for wtom the semce Js perfcrmed has
thJ right tD requh! axnpftarxe with lhe lns1nlcUons.
·
.
·
FJM)l;GS: P.ur ~~" oftbc qllUtiJanai'oa providod by 1ho &ecarity of&cl'I, fltcy did not roccivo specific
eompany w.rit=:11Mtruction1 rcprdh1g lhe ,rork pcnbnnod. It ii not kllOWSl lfibo contra;tor fin cloaablg
sorvices recoh'od ipocfflc !nstnl'110D1 roprding tho sorvmos.providcd.
Ta-abulg - Training a worker byrequlmg or expedltw a n ~ per,on 1D work with UlO wcner, ti(
amspondfng with 11\e worker, by requiring the warfe' to attend meetings, er by ustng ~ methods, rmcates
that Ifie employer rcr wham 1he servlal ls perro. n.ecf ecpects the sehAa) tD be performed Jn a parUcular method or

manner.

·

I

~ : Tho ttatus quosiionn&m provLfod.by Jbe aeovrity offlcm vottii,d lbef dld no~ rocaivD nl:ning by
tho cnnp Joyc:r.
PaCe or Sequence• Arequlrement that~ ~r'Ace must be JXlM(fed eta pace or a ~ sequenm ct duties
Imposed by lhe employer Indicates ca1rol or dlrectiOn. The 030nilnatfnr, bnd sdledullng of the services of more
than one wcr1er does not lndial~ mntrof.and dlredian.
1410 East 300 SoUth • SIi Lake a.y, Ulah 84111
'
601-526-9235 • crtcl free 800 ZZZ-2857 • FAX 801-525:SZH • Relay utah 7U
Spa111s11 Reny Utah 1-iBS-346--3162 • Eblaf ~rtdy ~ • jobs.utap.grw

I

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Exhibit: 74

74

~

.ADDENDUM B
FINDJNGS: Tho status qqeJtfomiai'os provfdttd by the security offioon v~riiled a pac" or soqlJDuec: wa111ot
reqmrcd l>y tho cmployor,
Work on Btdorer'• Prenfses • A miurement that the sen.ice be performed on the emplav=-15 ~
lrdc:ateS ttmtthe empoyerfor whom the serw:e Is perlbrmed has retained a rtght tD ~ end oversee the
manner 1n which tie sen-ice Is perb'med, especially If lhe seNlm cx,uid be perfaJ uied elsewhere. ,
P1NDJNGS: Tho aocu:rliy offlcer1 wore roqoircd IO pcdbna tho si;:rv~cs at tho employers pmni&os due to iha
a&t:tro oftho work.

'·

:j
•I

.J

PeJ'IOJIII SetYlce • Areq,JJsnent ht the .setvlca must be performed personaly Rf may not be assigned to
others hdcates lhe ~10 cordrOf or direct the manner In wHdl the work ls performed.
FHD"lGS: Per review ofdio oompfoted smtur questfonnani by tho soo1Jtlty c.ffloers duo to ibo nature ofthe
scrvloe, provided, the empbyor ~quirod tho work to be porfbrmed penDnaUy by tho aocudty ofticu and •
tout l>o usipod co other sDClU'ity offlcen to p,rfonn the 11mc sotvbca tll1'll tho contragton n.candll)'
ompJofmciat of&er.

Contnuoua relatl>IWhfp • A ~ semte relatfonsl1p between the wane- arm the empcver lndlmtes that
an empayer-emptoyee relattonshlp ec1sts. Aconttruous relaUonshlp may exist where work Is perb1ned f"t911arly
or at lt'equriy rewrrlrG although Irregular Intervals. Aa,nttnu~ relltJonshlp does not e)!ISt where the ~ Is
~ to cnmptete spedflCally tdentlf1ed proJed$, even though 1he serva relatfonslllp may~ owr a
slgriflrant period of ttme.
flNDlNGS: ~ coatraot workora had a oontmuou, rol&t!onship \TI1h PBAC ancl 11ervlces wen, pcrfbrmod

r

Cbroupo111 She yous 2014 & ZO 1s.

Set Hon of Wort ,-The estBbOshment rt set hours or a specfflc number of hours dworkbythe employEr
lrdc:ates mntn>L .
.
.
.
FINDJr«a no securlty offlaots tb&t oompiowd the stab.la quoajbrmalrc znarked ~" roprding mqmd 1D
wort schodlllod hours tllr,o'tlgbovt th, wiiok. .
I

Method of Paymellt ... Pa')'1nent by the hcu, ~ er monih points tD an employer-employee relationship,
provkfed ltlattfis mett1od o f ~ !5 r)Otjusta c=nvenientweyd J]aring ~ bHllngs as Ft of a fbced
price agreed l.pJl ash CXl$t of a job. Control may also ast when lf1e ·employs- ~nes the meltiod of

payment

flM)]JGS: Tho so~gr&y:affic~ra wore paid an hoqrty w11p fi,r tho work

perlbnnod,

1he twenty.eight wcrtan performed a personal Set\4ce and rece1Yed remuneratton based us»n that snce and wa-e In
emplv.-nent\riess exempted by Sedfan 35+204(3).
:

I have cietermtned that 1tm twenty-dghtwcriers were not astmnarJry engaged In an rrdependenUy estntiished lnlde,
OCXXJpatfon, profeSSion, or btmness ard did not create an independent business that exiSted apart from the refaUonsNp wltf1
your annparf)', Paragraphs (a) ~rxl (b) of Sec:tfon 3SA+20.1{3) are a,njl.lrtCfm. That Is, ~ must: be satfsfled. Thererore,
peyments made to the a>ntrad workers for the.persanal &eMCe prtMded to~ buslness are wages 5\bject wthe
Bnployment Sea.rlty Alt (VnempfO)fflent~), Addltlanally, Bf'¥ other lndivfduals Wring for yotS"enutyr,lder tt1e
same c:frtwlstanees mzsy also t,e cansfdered entpltr,ees to wfJCxn you paid wages subject to the Att.

I ermrage YDlJ ID vo!unmrify report the wsgei cf other worlc2rs employed In the smne draanstances. You may be subjed:
to a foJlaw-Up audit to reMew. your busltess rea>rds' for possible mlsdassHJed war1<ers. 'Jf you would fflce assistance In the
preparaUon rt the report{s), please ~a me ~the phone number IJsted beftwt.

.

.

1tt0east JOO SOltll • sa t.u: e2y, U1atr 841U
101-526-9235 •«t01trea BOO 222-2857 • FAX801"5U-9236 • Rela'f Uta11 ru
Spanish Wry t.bh 1-&346-!UQ • Equa!Opportunly~rrs • Jabs.Utilts.~
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.IUQff n> APPfAlJ If ycu belleve'tius dedslan I s ~ appeal by mall m; lbh DepartmentofWoMcrce se"1tm,
Hearing otncer, PO SOX 4m&, Salt Utle
Umh 94145-028& You tan aliO fax-ycur &ll)peal l0 801-526-9236. Your

atv,

appeal nut be In wrflill!I and be reawad or pomnmed Within flfteen (15) dir,s liom t!1e dalll "this letter: Mappeal
. remYed er pastmarted aRer fifteen (15) days tram the date at INs letter mav be considered r good cause for 1he In Rllhg
can be ~blf6b!!d. Yru appeal must be slpd byyou or~ l e g a l ~ and shoW your ftmfs nanra, employer
----......-..-r-. 1 date ~ or sert byfax. Also please sfafl? the reason ror your appeal,

FJB,DAu,t'l"OR
(801)45$-3515

~te MeUect. 3/01/2016

140 Eest300 SIOIAh • sat \ilte Cly, IJt.Qh &ml
601-516-9235 • er tali fn,e 800 222--2857 • F,\X801~ • Retlry Utlh 7U
Span\sh RaV utab 1..SB8-34H162 •fcluBIOppoituntv E,rployer/~ • jobs.ltah.P
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ADDENDUM C

DEPARTMENT OF WORI(FORCE SERVICES
Field Audit Determiua&n
HeariJigs Officer Decision.

HOI)EC

Appellant

FUR BREEDERS AGRICT,JLTURAL
COOPERATIVE
8700 S 700W
SANDY UT 84070

EMPLOYER NO: C 4-002614-0
HEAIUNGS OF.FICER DECISION:
Stephen Hingham provided a personal service for a wage which is subject to
Unemployment Insurance Contributions.
Officers provided a personal service for a wage whioh is ~bject to
Unemployment Insurance Contributions.
CASE HISTORY: ..

Issues to be Reviewed:

3SA-4-208
35A~-204

Service for a Wage
.
Contract ofHire/Independent Contractor
'

The original Field Audit d~tennination held that Officers provided a personal service for a wage which
constituted employment
1

HEARINGS OFFICER REVIEW;
For the review of this case the Hearings Officer consulted with Dale Chrisensen, Financial Offic~ and
. Scott Rawlings, Legal Counsel, for Fur Breeders Agricultural Cooperative (Appellant). Kenneth
Hansen. Coordinator for UPD, Heather Lyn Drips, UPD Detective, Zach Bench, UPD Detective. also
participated in the hearing. This determination is based on the Hearings Officer's consultation with
these individuals in conjunction with a review of dOQUDlents from the original audit investigation.
Findings of Fact

Fur Breeders Agricultural Coope~ve (Appellant) is a farmer cooperative that mixes feed and sells
supplies to the fur breeding industry. The Appellant hires contracted off..<futy peace officers (Officers)
to provide s~rity and law enforcement presence for their property. A Field Auditor representing the
Depat1lnent conducted an audit on the Appellant for the years 2014 and 2015. The Field Auditor
detemuned the Officers were misclassified and should have been reported as employees for State
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Fur Breeders Agricultural Cooperative

C 4-002614-0

Un~ployment Insurance. The Field Auqitor also determined that Stepben Hingham should have been
reported as an employee. Stephen Hingham performed lawn mowing aod weeding services for the
employer. The Appellant appealed the Field Auditors determination regarding the Officers and Stephen
Hingham.

Stephen IDnghm.n
Stephen Hin~ was a high school student that approached the Appellant looking for work mowing
lawns. The Appellant hired Mr. Hingham to mow the lawn and do some weeding. The lawn mower
was supplied by the Appellant. Mr. Hingham supplied some small~ tools. He was paid a set fee
each time the lawn was mowed. The Appellant paid Mr. Hingham monthly for his services. The
Appellant does not know if Mr, Hingham does lawn services for other clients. There is no evidence he
advertises his services to the public. Mr, Hingham set his own schedule and mowed the lawn at his
convenience. The Appellant did give Mr. Hingham any training with regards to bis work. Mr.
Hingham was uot requ.ired to perform the job personally. The Appellant was only interested in the final
result of the lawn being mowed once a week. ~ Mr. Hingham graduated froJ;D High School, he was
hired as a part time employee by the Appellant. As an ~loyee, he provided services as a forklift
operator inside the Appellant's facilities.

not

~

Officers

Officers used by the Appellant are employees of the Unified Police Department ({}PD). UPI) has a
program withm their department for Officers searching for secondary etnployment UPI> Officers
seeking part time jobs outside of the department must coordinate through the Secondary Employment
Coordinator. The Appellant contact! the Secondary Employment Coordinator (CoQrdinator) for UPD
and specifies when and where they need Officers, The Coordinator lists the job in the UPD software
system. Many of these secondary jobs are considered by UPD to be contract work UPD's secondary
employer agreement states: ''It is the respon.st"bility the employer to maintafn all Federal and State Tax
records in accordance with City, State, and Federal guideJines for each officer employed." Officers
access the system twi~e a month and submit their name for jobs they are interested in worldng. Officers
are not guaranteed any job because the software system controls who getJ the work Officers are

of

assigned the jobs and receive their schedule from the UPD Coordinator. UPD deteIDJines the hourly pay

Officers received for these jobs, The Appellant receives an invoice from· UPD listing the individual
Officers that provided s~ty services for them. The Appellant issues individual checks to the
Officers. The Appellant sends the checks to the UPD Coordmator to distn1,ute to the Officers, The
Appellant issues the Officers a 1099 at the end of the year for their services.

Officers use their UPD uniforms .and police vehicles wheµ providing services for the Appellant They
also use guns, handcuffs, radios and bullet proof vests, Some of the equipment is purchased by them
and some of it is the property of UPD. The Appellant is charged a fee by UPD for the use of the car and
gas. T.JPD expects the Officers to respond to any emergency calla if they are needed while working these
part time jobs. The Officers work for several different companies through UPD•s seC011dary
employment system. Officers have not obtained business licenses, liability insurance, or Workers
Compensation insurance with the- intent of being independent._
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The Appellant gives general instructions to the Officers regarding the secutjty detail, The Officers are
expected to adhere to UPD's secondary employment policy. Officers are trained by UPD on how to
handle various incide#ts and threats. The scheduling is handled by l)PD's software system, If an
Officer scheduled to work for the Appellant is unable to work the shjft, the T)Pl:> Coordinator ll'lU.St
approve the replacement. The Appellant does no~ know in advance who uPD schedules to work the
security assignment. The Appellant 8illd their staffbave very little interactjon with the Offi~ during
their shift. The UPJ;> Coordinator is the liaison between the Appellant and the Officers.

Hearings Officer Assessment
.Stephen Hingham .

The Hearings Officer finds no dispute Stephen Hingham was compensated for rus mowing services.
This COllstitutes a wage pursuant to Section 35A4-208 of the Employm~nt Security Act. ·
Pursuant to Section JSA-4-204 of the Employment Security Act. it must be shown to the satisfaction of
the Department that an individual is both customarily engaged in an-independently established business
and free from O?ntrol and direction in· order to be considered legitimately independently established..
3SA-4-204. Definition of employment.
(1) Subject to the other provisions of this section, "employment" means any service performed for
wages Qr under any contract of hire, whether written or oral, express or impli~ including service in
interstate commmce, and service as an officer of a corporation.
·
(3) Services performed QY an individual for wages or under any contract qf bire, written or oral,
express or implied, are considered to be employment subject to this cbapter. unless it is shown to the
satisfaction of the division that:
.

.

(a) the individual is customarily engaged in an independently established 1?3de, occupatiQD,
profession, or busiiless of the St\llle nature as that involved in the contract of hire for service,; and
(b) the individual has been and will continue to be free ftom control or direction over the means of
performance of those services, both under the individual's contract of hire and in fact.
The Hearings Officer finds there is no evidence Mr, Hingham was engaged in a business activity
providing lawn care services. Mr. Hingham did not have a significant investment in yard maintenance
equipment Mr. Hingham ha{j no ongoing expenses relating to his. lawn care services. There was no
evidence Mr. Hingham provided lawn care services for other clients on a regular basis. Mr. Hingham
did not advertise his service$ to generate clients. The Appellant's association with Mr. Hingham
resembles part time employment rather than an employer/ independent contractor relationship. The
Appellant did not demonstrate a level of control and direction over Mr. Hingham.'s lawn sei:vices that
would indicate employment However, the independent contractor test is conjunctive and both tb.e (a)
and the (b) portion of the test must be met for Mr. Hingham to qualify as an independent contractor.
Therefore, Mr. Hingham does not meet the requitements tp be an independent contractor for State
Unemployment Insurance purposes.
The Hearings Officer finds Stephen Hingham w~ not customarily engaged in an independently
established business activity. The Department•s original determination that payments to $tep~en
Hingham were subject to Unemployment Insurance, was correct.

I
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I

Officers
The Heatings Officer finds the Officers performed a servfoe for the Appellant and were paid a wage for
those services. The Appellant issued the Officers a 1099 at the end of the year fut the services
perfonned for their business, The Officers meet the definition 0£ employment The Hearings Officer
must next address whether the Officers meet the requirements of independent contractors as outlined in
· the Utah Employment Security Act and Utah Administrative Code.

R994-204-303.

.Factors for Determining Ind~pendent Contractor Statos•

. Ser.vices will be excluded under Section ·3SA-4-204 if the smice meets the
requirements of this rule. Special scrutiny of the facts is required to assure that the fotm
of a service relationship does not obscure its substance, that is, ~hether _the worker is
~dependently es~ablished in a liko trade, occupation, profession or business and is free
from control and direction. The factors listed in subsections R994-204-303(1)(b) a,ad
R994-20~303(2)(b) of this section are intended only as aids in the analysis of the mets of
each. case. The degree of importance of each factor varies depending on the service and ·
the factual context in which it is performed: Additionally, some factors do not apply to
certain services and, therefore~ should not be considered.
I

(1)

i

Independently Established.

lI

-~

(a)
An individual will be considered customarily engaged in an iµdepende+itly
established 1radet occupation, profession, or bnsi.ness if the individual is, at the time the
service is performed; regularly engaged in a trade, occupation. profession, or business of
the same nature as the service performed, and the trade, occupation, profession, or
business is ~lished independently of the alleged employer. In other words. ID:
independently established "trade, occupation, profession, or business is created and exists
apart from a relationship with a particular employer and does not depend on a.
relationshjp wnh any one employer for its continued existence.
(b) ·
The following factors, if applicable, will determine whether a worker is
customan1y engaged in an independently established trade or business:
(i)

. Separate Place of Business. The worker has a place of busi,ness separate

from that of the employer.

i)

(ii)
Tools and Equipment. The worker has a substantial investment in the tools,
equipment, or facilities customarily required to perform the services. However, "tools of
the trarle" used by certain trades or crafts do not necessarily demonstrate independence.

(iiO
Oth~r Clients. The worker regularly perfonns services of the same nature
for other customers or clients and is not required to work excll)Sively for one employer.
(iv)
Profit or Loss, The worker can realize a profit or risks a loss from expenses
and debts incurred through an independently established J:,usiness activity.
(v}
Advertising. The worker advertises services in telephone directories,
newspapers, magazines, the Intemet, or by other methods clemly demonstrating an effort
to generate business.
·
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(vi,
Licenses, The worker has obtained any required and customary business,
trade, or professional licenses.

(vii)
Business Records and Tax Forms. The worker maintains records or
documents that validate expenses, business asset valuation or income earned so he or she
may tile self-employment and other b\lSincss tax fonns with the Internal Revenue Service
and other agencies.
·

(c)
If an employer proves to the satisfaction 9f the Department that the worker
is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation. professio:r;i or
business of the same nature as the service mquestion, there. will be a rebuttable
pres.umption that the employer did not have the right of or ext;reise direction or control
· over the service.
·
·
(2)

Control and Direction.

(a)
When an e.mployer retains the right to QOD.trol and direct 1;he performance of
a service, or actually exercises con1rol aDd direction over the worker who penorms the
servic~, not only as to the result to be accomplished by the work but also as to the manoer
and means by which that result is to be accomplishedt the worker is an employee of the
employer for the purposes of the Act.
(b)
The following factors, if applicable,. will be used as aids in determining ·
whether an employer bas the right of or exercises control and directiciti over the service of
a worker:

Instructions. A worker whQ is required to comply with -other persons'
instructions about how the service is to. be perfonned is ordinarily an employee. This .
factor is present if the employer for wbom the service is performed has the right to
require compliance with the instructions.
(i)

(ii)
Training. Training a worker by requiring or expecting an experienced
person to work with the worker, by corresponding with the worker, by requiring the·

worker to attend meetings, or by using other methods, indicates that the employer for
Cj

whom the service is perfoIIDed expects the service to be performed in a particular metboo
or manner.
(ili)
Pace or Sequence. A requirement that the service must be provided at a
pace or ordered sequence of duties imposed by the employer indicates control or
direction. The coordinating and scheduling of the servjces of more than one worker does
not indicate control and direction.

(iv) · Work on Employer's Premises. A requirement that the service be performed
on the employer's premises indicates that the employer for whom the service is performed
has retained a right to supervise and oversee the manner in which the service is
performed, especially if the service could be performed elsewhere.

(v)
Personal Service. A requirement that the service must be performed
personally and may not be assigned to others indicates the right to control or direct the
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manner "in which the work is perfonnfd
(vi) • Continuous Relationship. A continuous service relationship between
the worker and the employer indicates that an employer-employee relationship
exists.. A continuous relationship tnay exist where work is perfonned regularly or
at frequently recuning although irregular intervals. A continuous relationship
does not exist where the worker is eontracted to complete specitically jdentified
projects, even though the service relationship may extend o~er@ significant period
of time.

(vu)
Set Hours of Work. The establishment of set hours or a specific
number of hours of work by the employer indicates control.

(vfu) Method of Payment Payment by the hour, week, or month points to
an employer-employee relatiouship, provided that. this method of payment is not
just a convenient way of paying progress billings as part of a fixed price agreed
upon as the cost of a job, Control may also exist when the Ctllployer determines
the method of payment.
The Officers do not opcraw an ~dependent business activity for the purpose of part time security
woik. The Officers depend on ~ relatiODShip with UPD for tbeir secobdacy employment jobs.
UPD provides the Officers with schedules, uniforms, insurance, vehicles, and deterorlnes their
hourly pay. The Officers do not have an investment in their secondary employment jo~s. None
of the. Officers have obtained business liceDSes with the intent of providing security services

apart

from UPD's secondary employment system.

Officers have no special investment in
· equipment or tools that are separate from the equipment and tools they need as employees of
UPD. The UPD Coordinator handles the financial aspects of the jobs witl;l the Appell~
Officers are not a'ble to realize a profit or suffer loss as they do not make decisions regarding
their rate of pay or negotiate financial matters with the Appellant

The Hearing Officer finds Officers have. not created an independently established trade,
occupatioDt profession, or business apart from TJPD~s secondary employment department.
Officers do not qualify as independent contractors while working security jobs for the Appellant
Sinoe the indq,endent contractor test is conjunctive, the control and direction portion of the test
wi11 not be addressed in reference to these individuals.

CONCLUSION
The Field Audit determination holding Officers performed a service for a wage constituting
employment subject to unemployment insurance coverage, pursuant to Sections 3SA-4-208 and
3SA-4-2.04 of the Utah Employment Security Act, is affirmed.
The Field Audit determination holding Stephen Hingµant perfonned a service for a wage
constituting employment subject to unemployment insurance coverage. pursuant to SectioDS
3SA4-208 and 35A-4-204 of the Utah Employment Secll;rl.ty Act, is affirmed.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Exhibit: 86

86

~

Fur Breeders Agricultural Cooperative

· APPEAL RIGHTS: The following decision will beoome final unless, within fifteen (15) days
from the date of ma.lling, further written appeal is made setting forth the grounds upon which the
appeal is made, the relief requested, and the date the appeal is made. Mai! appeals to Utah
Department of Workforce Services, Appeals Section, P.O. Box 4S244. Salt Lake City, UT
84145-0244; FAX 801-526-9242.

Susan Cottam
Hearings Officer
DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE SERVICES
~

Date Issued and Mailed:

7/2O/l016

,

I
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Decision of Administrative Law Judge

Appellant

FUR BREEDERS AG RI CULTIJRAL COOP
8700 S 700 W
SANDY UT 84070-2520

CASE NO:

16-A-05377-T

EMPLOYER NO:

002614-0

APPEAL DECISION: The officers are considered to be emp]oyees and not independent contractors.·
The Appellant is subject to unemployment insurance contributions.

CASE HISTORY:
Appearances:
Issues lo be Decided:

Appellant/Department
3 SA-4-204( J) - Contract of Hire
35A-4-204(3) - Independent Contractor
3SA-4-208
- Service for a Wage

The Department's original decision found police officers to have provided a service for a wage under a
contract of hire and were employees and not independent contractors subjecting the Appellant tq
unemployment insurance contributions.
APPEAL RIGHTS: This decision will become final unless, within 30 days from October 12, 2016,
further written appeal is received by the Workforce Appeals Board (PO Box 45244, Salt Lake City, UT
84145-0244; FAX 801-526-9244; or online at http://www.jobs.utah.gov/appeals) setting forth the grounds
upon which the appeal is made.
·

FINDINGS OF FACT:
The Appellant manufactures and distributes animal feed to fanners who raise animals for their fur. The
Appellant has had concerns about threats of destruction of its property from individuals who may be
against the fur industry. The Appellant desired to have security and a greater police presence around its
facility during times when the Appellant was not present. The Appellant contacted the Unified Police
Department (UPD) requesting additional police presence around its facility. The Unified Police
Department has a secondary employment program that coordinates secondary employment for its police
officers. According to UPD policies it prohibits police officers from working outside the UPD providing'
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security services outside the secondary employment program. The UPD agreed to assist in th~
scheduling of police officers to provide a police presence and security at the Appellant's facility. During
the years 2_0 I 4 and 20 I 5, the individuals listed on Exhibits 21 through 27 of the hearing record as being
included as employees provided services to the Appellant as police officers or security officers. The
Appellant paid the officers directly after the Appellant provided the names and times the officers provided
the services to the Appellant. The UPD set the fee for the officers' services at $30 per hour, which the
Appellant paid.
.
All of the officers were employees of the UPD. The UPD pays officers $700 per year for them ·to
purchase any tools or equipment or supplies needed to provide services as a police officer. Often this
amount is not sufficient to cover all costs and the officers at times may purchase items using their owri
money. The officers also provided services to other companies through the UPD secondary employmen{
program.
· The officers enroll in the secondary employment program with the UPD in order to be available fo~
secondary jobs and indicate when they would be available to provide these services. The UPD woulq

then schedule the officers according to the Appellant's needs.
When the officers provided the services to the Appellant they wore UPD uniforms and drove a UPO
vehicle.
·
The Appellant did not require the officers to follow any instructions as to how to provide their servic~~i
The Appellant provided no training and did not require them to perform their services in any certain pa~
or sequence. The officers provided services on an as-needed basis.

REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
Section 35A-4-204 of the Utah Employment Security Act defines employment. This section st~te~1 jn
part:
(1) · Subject to the other provisions of this section, "employment" means any service
performed for wages or under any contract of hire, whether written or oral, express or
implied, including service in interstate commerce, and service as an officer of a
corporation.
The Unemployment Insurance Rules provide:

R994-208-l 02.

Wages Include.

Wages include the following:
(I)

Payments for Personal Services.

All payments by the hour, by the job, piece rate, salary, or commission are wages.

Toe evidence presented during the hearing established that all of the law enforcement officers provide1 ~
service to the Appellant and were paid for the services by the Appellant. The Utah Employment SecW'llY,
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Act indicates this constitutes employment. It must be detennined whether this employment is covered
employment under the Utah Employment Security Act or exempt under any provision of the Act. ~~
Administrative Law Judge could not find no specific provision in the Act or the rules pertaining ther~t9
that would exclude the services of law enforcement officers under the present circumstances. 111.~
Administrative Law Judge will anal~ whether the services should be exempt under the· indepenoeh'!
contractor provisions of the law and rules.
The Unemployment Insurance Rules further provide:
R994-204-301.

Independent Contractor Services.

(I) An· independent contractor is a worker who is customarily engaged in an
independently established trade, occupation, profession, or business of the same nature as
the services perfonned, and the individual providing the services must be free from the
employer's control and direction while performing services for the employer. A worker
must clearly establish his or her status as an independent contractor by taking steps that
demonstrate independence indicating an infonned business decision has been made.
(2) Payments to or through another entity for personal services perfonned by a
worker is exempt from employment if the personal services meet the provisions of Section
35A-4-204(3).
R994-204-302.

Independent Contractor Determination.

(1) The Department will determine the status of a worker based upon information
provided by the employer, the worker, and any other available source.
(2) If a worker files a claim for benefits and the Department, as the result of an audit,
investigation, or declaratory ruling, has made a detennination that the worker is an
independent contractor and his or her services for an employer are exempt from coverage,
any earnings from those services for that employer will be excluded from the claimant's
monetary detennination. The claimant may protest the monetary detennination by filing
an appeal as provided in R994-204-402.
R994-204-303.

Factors for Determining Independent Contractor Status.

Services will be excluded under Section 35A-4-204 if the service meets the
requirements of this rule. Special scrutiny of the facts is required to assure that the fonn of
a service relationship does not obscure its substance, that is, whether the worker is
independently established in a like trade, occupation, profession or business and is free
from control and direction. The factors listed in subsections R994-204-303(1)(b) and
R994-204-303(2)(b) of this section are intended only as aids in the analysis of the facts of
each case. The degree of importance of each factor varies depending on the service and
the factual context in which it is performed. Additionally, some factors do not apply to
certain services and, therefore, should not be considered.
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-4Independently Established.

(a) An individual will be considered customarily engaged in an independently
established trade, occupation, profession, or business if the individual is, at the time the
service is perfonned, regularly engaged in a trade, occupation, profession, or business of
the same nature as the service performed, and the trade, occupation, profession, or business
is established independently of the alleged employer. In other words, an independently
established trade, occupation, profession, or business is created and exists apart from a
relationship with a particular employer and does not depend on a relationship with any one
employer for its continued existence.

(b) The fol1owing factors, if applicable, will determine whether a worker is
customarily engaged in an independently established trade or business:

~

(i) Separate Place of Business. The worker has a place of business separate from
that of the employer.
(ii) T~ols and Equipment. The worker has a substantial investment in the tools,
equipment, or facilities c1,1stomarily required to perfonn the services. However, "tools of
the trade" used by certain trades or crafts do not necessarily demonstrate independence.
(iii) Other Clients. The worker regularly performs services of the same nature for
other customers or clients and is not required to work exclusively for one employer,

(iv) Profit or Loss. The worker can realize a profit or risks a loss from expenses and
debts incurred through an independently established business activity.
(v) Advertising.
The worker advertises services in telephone directories,
newspapers, magazines, the Internet, or by other methods clearly demonstrating an effort
to generate business.

(vi) Licenses. The worker has obtained any required and customary business, trade,
or professiooal licenses.
(vii) Business Records and Tax Fonns. The worker maintains records or documents
that validate expenses, business asset valuation or income earned so he or she may file
self-employment and other business tax forms with the Internal Revenue Service and other
agencies.
(c) If an employer proves to the satisfaction of the Department that the worker is
customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession or
business of the same nature as the service in question, there will be a -rebuttable
presumption that the employer did not have the righ1 of or exercise direction or control over

the service.
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Control and Direction.

(a) When an employer retains the right to control and direct the performance of a
service, or actually exercises control and direction over the worker who performs the
service, not only as to the result to be accomplished by the work but also as to the manner
and means by which that result is to be accomplished, the worker is an employee of the
employer for the purposes of the Act
(b) The following factors, if applicable, will be used as aids in detennining whether
an employer has the right of or exercises control and direction over the service of a worker:
(i) Instructions. A worker who is required to comply with other persons'
instructions about how the service is to be perfonned is ordinarily an employee. This
factor is present if the employer for whom the service is perfonned has the right to require
compliance with the instructions.
(ii) Training. Training a worker by requiring or expecting an experienced person to
work with the worker, by corresponding with the worker;i,y requiring the ·worker to attend
meetings, or by using other methods, indicates that the employer for whom the service ·is
performed expects the service to be perfonned in a particular method or manner.
(iii) Pace or Sequence. A requirement that the service must be provided at a pace or
ordered sequence of duties imposed by the employer indicates control or direction. The
coordinating and scheduling of the services of more than one worker does not indicate
control and direction.

(iv) Work on Employer's Premises. A requirement that the service be perfonned on
. the employer's premises indicates that the employer for whom the service is perfonned has
retained a right to supervise and oversee the manner in which the service is performed,
especially if the service could be performed elsewhere.
(v) Personal Service. A requirement that the service must be performed personally
and may not be assigned to others indicates the right to control or direct the manner in
which the work is performed.
(vi) Continuous Relationship. A continuous service re)ationship between the worker
and the employer indicates that an employer-employee relationship exists. A continuous
relationship may exist where work is perfonned regularly or at frequently recurring
although irregular intervals. A continuous relationship does not exist where the worker is
contracted to complete specifically identified projects, even though the service relationship
~ay exten~ over a signi_ficant p_e~?d of time.

(vii) Set Hours of Work. The establishment of set hours or a specific number of hours
of work by the employer indicates control.
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(viii) Method of Payment Payment by the hour, week, or month points to an
employer-employee relationship, provided that this method of payment is not just a
convenient way of paying progress billings as part of a fixed price agreed upon as the cost
of a job. Control may also exist when the empJoyerdetennines the method of payment.

The Appellant has the burden of proof in establishing the officers were customarily engaged in an
independently established trade, occupation, profession, or business of law enforcement or security during
the same time they provided these same services to the Appel1anL The evidence must show the officers
made an informed business decision to be independently established as a business, trade, occupation, or
profession. The Appe1lant has not met its burden. The evidence presented during -the hearing
established that all of the officers were employees of the UPD. The evidence established the UPD
prohibited the officers from providing law enforcement or secwity services outside of its secondary
employment program. No evidence was presented that demonstrated any of the officers had their own
security or law enforcement business. During the hearing the Appellant's own witness testified that the
officers establishing their own security officer business may be contrary to the law. There was no
evidence presented the officers had any separate place of business. The evidence did not establish the
officers made a substantial investment in tools, equipment, or supplies necessary in providing their
services. The UPD provided the vehicle and paid the officers $700 a year to assist in the purchase of tools
or equipment or supplies necessary to provide law enforcement or security services. There was no
evidence presented that any of the officers advertised their services as independent contractors provjding
law enforcement or security services. There was no evidence any of the officers had business license
demonstrating an informed business decision to be independently establfshed as a security officer or law
enforcement individual. In fact, it would seem contrary to law for there to be an independently
established law enforcement business as opposed to a strictly security services business. While the
officers may have provided services for other clients, the testimony and evidence in the heariqg
established this could only happen through the UPD's secondary employment program. Thi~
demonstrates a clear lack of independence: Since the officers were not required to make a substantial
investment in order to provide their services. Any risk of financial loss appeared to be minimal and not' tq,
be a significant factor in detennining whether or not they were independently established. All
individuals who provide a service are always at risk they may not be paid for their services, but )ii
independently established trade, occupation, or profession or business may have additional ris~
financial loss that have not been established by the Appellant The Administrative Law Judge finds
is simply an insufficient amount of evidence to establish under the Utah Employment Security Act and th~

~

.oJ
th~r~

rules pertaining thereto that the police officers were independently established in their owri ir'aci.~~
occupation, profession, or business. Their main occupation or profession was as a police officer worki~g
for the UPD and it has not been demon~trated they were customarily engaged in an independentfx.

established business.
The Administrative Law Judge finds there was not that level of control in and of itself to cause tqe
working relationship to be an employer/employee relationship. However, the Appellant
must establisfi
.
. ,\,.
independence and lack of control and since the Appellant has not estabhshed the officers wer~
-·independently established~ theAdmiriisfralive taw"Judge must find-they ate-considered·to-be employe¥~
under the Utah Employment Security Act and the Appellant is subject to unemployment insuranc~
contributions.
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DECISION AND ORDER:
The Department representative's decision finding officers to have provided a service for a wage and werij
employees and not independent contractors subjecting the Appellant to unemployment insurance
contributions pursuant to Sections 35A-4-204 and 208 of the Utah Employment Security Act is affirmed~

ary S. Gibbs

A

· istrative Law Judg~

DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE SERVIC'E~
Date Issued and Sent:

October 12, 2016
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cc:

April Larsen
DWS Field Audit
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ADDENDUM E
WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD
Department of Workforce Services
Division of Adjudication

Fonn BRDEC

FUR BREEDERS AGRICULTURAL
COOPERATIVE
Employer No. 002614-0
Case No. 16-B-00534-T
DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE
SERVICES

DECISION OF WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD:
The decision of the Administrative Law Judge is affirmed.
Services performed by off-duty police officers constitute employment subject to coverage.
HISTORY OF CASE:
In a decision dated October 12, 2016, Case No. 16-A-05377-T, the Administrative Law Judge
affirmed a Department decision finding off-duty police · officers to be employees and not
independent contractors, and to have provided a service for a wage under a contract of hire
pursuant to §§35A-4-204(1), 204(3), and 208 of the Utah Employment Security Act.

JURISDICTION OF WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD:
The Workforce Appeals Board has authority to review the Administrative Law Judge's decision
pursuant to §35A-4-508(4) and (5) of the Utah Employment Security Act and the Utah
Administrative Code ( 1997) pertaining thereto.
EMPLOYER APPEAL FILED: November 11, 2016.

ISSUE BEFORE WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD AND APPLICABLE PROVISION
OF UT Alf EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT:
Were the services performed by off-duty police officers on behalf of the Employer considered
employment subject to unemployment insurance coverage pursuant to the provisions of §§35A..:
4-204( 1), 204(3), and 208?

. FACTUAL FINDINGS:
The Workforce Appeals Board adopts in full the factual findings of the Administrative Law
Judge.
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REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
The Appellant is a cooperative that manufactures animal feed and delivers it to constituent
members who are primarily mink ranchers. Throughout the years the cooperative has had its
property damaged by animal rights groups. In an effort to protect its interests, the Appellant paid
off-duty officers of the Unified Police Department (UPD) to provide security for its property.
UPD, does not have the resources to accommodate requests for private security while
simultaneously fulfilling its mission to ensure public safety. It is a violation of UPD policy for
an off-duty officer to independently arrange for, and provide, off duty police-like functions for
remuneration. Nevertheless, UPD allows its off-duty officers to accept secondary employment if
it retains a measure of control over the process to avoid corruption and ensure that opportunities
are equitably distributed. With th~se goals in mind, UPD maintains a secondary employment
program that functions as a clearinghouse to match qualified off-duty officers with acceptable
jobs. The secondary employment program is strictly voluntary, and UPD receives no
compensation for the officef s services.
The Appellant participated in the secondary employment program during the relevant time
period. Off-duty officers performed services for the Appellant that directly benefitted it.
Although UPD sets the hourly rate for the secondary employment program, the general nature of
the work, the hours, and the dates of service were set by the Appellant. The Appellant directly
paid the officers for their services.
The Department and the Administrative Law Judge found the off-duty officers were in covered
employment for unemployment insurance purposes.
The record shows the officers provided services to the Appellant for a wage under a contract of
hire--albeit not a written contract. However, the Appellant contends the services .were perfonned
as independent contractors and therefore not subject to unemployment insurance contributions.

Law Governing the Independent Contractor Analysis
t,,;,,
~

On appeal to the Board, the Appellant asserts, "The only crucial test for an independent •
contractor r~lationship ... is whether [the Appellant] exercises any control, issues instructions as
to how the service is to be performed, or otherwise dictates the means and methods of
performing any such services."
The Appellant has incorrectly stated the relevant law. The Employment Security Act requires
the demonstration of two elements for workers to be considered independent contractors. First,
workers must be independently established in their own businesses. Second, workers must be
free from the employer's control and direction. These elements are conjunctive and both must be
proven. If the Appellant fails to establish either element, then the officers perfonned services in
covered employment subject to unemployment insurance contributions.
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The burden of proof to demonstrate the officers were independent contractors lies with the
Appellant. "Utah law presumes that individuals performing services for wages are employees
'unless it is shown to the satisfaction of the division that [the individual was independently
established and free from control and direction]."' Petro-Hunt, LLC v. Dep't of Workforce Servs.,
197 PJd 107, 114 (Utah App 2008).

Independently Established Trade or Business
The unemployment insurance rules list seven factors to aid in the determination of whether
workers are independently established in their own business. These factors are "intended only as
aids in the analysis of the facts of each case. The degree of importance of each factor varies
depending on the service and the factual context in which· it is performed." See Rule 994-204303. Some factors do not apply to certain services. The seven factors are:

Rule 994-204-303. Factors for Determining Independent Contractor Status

(b) The following factors, if applicable, will determine whether a worker is
customarily engaged in an independently established trade or business:

(i) Separate Place of Business. The worker has a place of business separate from
that ofthe employer.
The Appellant argues the separate place of business factor is not applicable because the "law
enforcement services were unique and could only be performed at [its] premises." It
alternatively contends this factor weighs in its favor because "each officer maintains their own,
separate residence at which and presumably each officer retains [business records and tools]."
This factor is not so rigid as to require an employer to demonstrate the workers established their
own physical office space or place of business. Rather, it probes into whether the worker can
perform the service at a location of their choice and who is responsible for providing that
workplace. Here, the officers provide security services at the Appellant's property. Guarding
property and deterring vandals does not allow for a choice of worksites. Because the security
services had to be performed at the Appellant's property the officers did not have the option to
perform their services elsewhere--whether they were independent contractors or not. As a
result, this factor is in~pplicable here.
1

The Appellant's argument the officers have a separate place of-eusiness because they are
assumed to have a residence is not persuasive. The service at issue was not performed from the
officers' residences and no evidence was presented to show they maintained a separate place of
business there.
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(ii) Tools and Equipment. The worker has a substantial investment in the tools,
equipment, or facilities customarily required to perform the services. However,
"tools of the trade" used by certain trades or crafts do not necessarily
demonstrate independence.

The record shows UPD issues its officers a service firearm and a $700 per year stipend to cover
additional equipment such as body armor, lights, boots, or a more desirable weapon. The
Appellant's witness, Mr. Hansen, testified many officers pay for equipment out of their own
pocket when they exceed the $700 allotment. It was unclear from the testimony whether police
unifQnns are also purchased from this stipend or whether there was a separate dedicated
allotment for this purpose.
The Appellant asserts the Administrative Law Judge "did not take adequate consideration [of]
the out-of-pocket expenses advanced by UPD officers" to perform their services. Aside from the
new evidence the Appellant presents on appeal regarding various uniform types and their
laundering requirements, it points to the officers presumed expenditure of funds on body armor,
boots, and improved firearms as evidence under this factor.
The Appellant did not meet its burden of proof on this issue. The witnesses were not able to
identify whether any of the officers included in the audit purchased equipment with their own
funds. Even if the Appellant had proven the officers made such purchases, the result here
probably would not change because this factor requires the officers to have made a substantial
investment in tools and equipment for the purpose of providing services in their allegedly
incJependently established business. If equipment was acquired for the purpose of providing
duty security through the secondary employment program, then this factor would weigh towards
independence. On the other hand, if equipment was obtained for the purpose of performing onduty police work, and only incidentally used for off-duty activities, then it is less likely there was
a substantial investment in tools and equipment.

off-

This principle is demonstrated in the recent case of Needle Inc. v. Dep'I of Workforce Servs.,
2016 UT App 85 (Utah Ct. App. 2016). In Needle the Utah Court of Appeals found the workers
did not make a substantial investment in tools and equipment when they purchased computers
and internet service before the employment and not in relation to the service performed for the
purported employer. The Court found:
[C]omputers and internet access are now common appurtenances of most citizens'
daily lives, used for shopping, schoolwork, social connection, and entertainment,
including online interaction. As a consequence, it w~ not error for the Board to
conclude that the acquisition of a computer and internet access was not a
"substantial investment" in the tools of a trade. This is particularly so where [the
employer] offered testimony that the [employees] work was itself "very part-time"
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and where [the employer] presented no evidence that the [employees] had acquired
wither computers or internet access for reasons other than [their] personal use.
Although body armor is not a "common appurtenance of most citizens' daily lives," the reasoning
in Needle is pertinent. Under this factor, the substantial investment in tools or equipment is to be
made in furtherance of the alleged business. No evidence was presented here the officers made
any equipment purchases beyond their allotted $700. The Appellant only assumes they did.
Moreover, even if they had, no evidence demonstrates any such Pl.l!Chases were made with the
provision of services for the Appellant in mind. Rather, any amounts beyond the stipend would
most likely be spent with an eye to ensuring the officers' safety and convenience in their primary
occupation as UPD officers-not in furtherance of the sporadic service provided for the
Appellant.
The Appellant has not met its burden of proof to demonstrate the officers made a substantial
investment in tools and equipment in order to perform services for an independently established
business. This factor weighs in favor of employment.

(iii) Other Clients. The worker regularly performs services of the same nature for
other customers or clients and is not required to work exclusively for one
employer.
An independently established business generally will not have only one client. The Court of
Appeals has provided guidance on the application of this factor. In Needle, the employer
complained the Board ignored evidence the workers were not "required to work exclusively for
[it]." Toe court was not persuaded:

(The "other clients") factor (also] requires more than just the ability to work
for someone other than the employer; the rules require that a worker's
"independently established trade . . . is created and exists apart from a
relationship with a particular employer and does not depend on a
relationship with any one employer for its continued existence." Utah Admin.
Code R994-204-303(1)(a); see also Leach v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n,
123 Utah 423, 260 P.2d 744, 748 (Utah 1953) (stating that an "independently
established business must exist independent of the services under consideration in
the sense that it is the whole-of which the particular service is a part"). In this
regard, it is not sufficient that a worker is merely "free to perform work for other
clients"; rather, the worker must actually "'regularly perfonn[]' work for other
clients," and the other work must be of the "'same nature"' as that provided in the
employment relationship at issue. Evolocity Inc. v. Department of Workforce
Servs., 2015 UT App 61, 11 14-15, 347 PJd 406 (quoting Utah Admin. Code
R994-204-303(1){b)(iii)). For example, in Evolocity, we concluded it was not
error for the Department of Workforce Services to determine that the claimant
"did not perform work for clients other than Evolocity" where there was no
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evidence that her short-tenn, part-time work for the United States Census Bureau
was "of the same nature as the work she performed- for Evolocity" and where,
even though the claimant was "free to work for other clients," there was no
evidence that she was "regularly perform[ing]" work for others. Id. (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted); see also Petro-Hunt LLC v. Department of
Workforce Servs., 2008 UT App 391, 1126-27, 197 P.3d 107 (concluding that this
factor weighed in favor of employment where the employee 11 did not have any
other clients besides Petro-Hunt" and where her employment contract also
contained a non-compete clause "which [the employee] believed prevented her
from perfonning similar services to any other client for a period of 12 months").
Thus, [the employer] must show that the [worker] provided services of a
similar nature to other clients in order to establish that this factor weighs in
favor of independence. [Emphasis added]

Mr. Hansen testified "most"· of the officers at issue provided similar security services for
construction companies and events such as marathons. However, he admitted none of the
officers do so through their own independently established business. Instead, all these activities
come through the secondary employment program. He further testified the officers would be
prohibited from providing these services for clients through their own independently established
business by UPD policy and perhaps even by a state statute prohibiting law enforcement officers
from obtaining a private security license. Nevertheless, the officers provided similar services of
the same nature for other clients. As a result, this factor weighs in favor of independence.

(iv) Profit or Loss. The worker can realize a profit or risks a loss from expenses
and debts incurred through an independently established business activity.
The Appellant argues the officers can experience a loss if it decided not pay them. It asserts the
loss would be represented by the "personal time invested that may not compensated."
In Needle, the Court of Appeals held the following with respect to this factor:
The Board seemed to interpret this factor to require that the profit or loss must be
tied to expenses or debts incurred through the business activity. In other words, it
reasoned that it is not enough for a worker to be able to realize a profit or suffer a
loss in earnings simply through performing more or less piecework of this kind.
Rather, the profit or loss must occur as a consequence of expenses or debts related
to the independent business activity. Our case law supports this interpretation. For
example, in Evolocity, we declined to disturb the Board's determination that the
employee could not realize a profit or loss where she incurred no debts or
expenses related to her work and where she could not "increase the amount she
was paid" because she was paid "a set salary every two weeks." Evolocity Inc. v.
Department of Workforce Servs., 2015 UT App 61, 11 18-19, 347 P.3d 406.
Similarly, in Petro-Hunt, we concluded that because "all the money" the alleged
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employee received "was pure profit with no accompanying risk of loss," PetroHunt had failed to show that the Board erred when it detennined that this factor
"weighed in favor of employment." Petro-Hunt LLC v. Department of Workforce
Servs., 2008 UT App 391, 128, 197 P.3d 107. Thus, unless an employer is able
to show that there is a risk of loss that accompanies the potential for profit,
this factor cannot support a determination of independence. [Emphasis added)
Here, the Appellant does not correctly distinguish between the ever-present risk of non-payment
and losses. If the officers were not paid for their services, then they would certainly be deprived
of money they are owed. However, any traditional employee who is paid by the hour runs this
risk of non-payment. But the unemployment rules are focused on the risk specific to
independent operators in the marketplace; namely, the losses arising from expenses and debts
accumulated from business activity. This risk is a part of capitalism and is more probative of an
entity's independence than the chance of not receiving a paycheck. The Appellant asserts the
nature of the service provided does not lend itself to losses. This is not a convincing argument.
Even a service-oriented business will be at some risk of loss from expenses ranging from the
acquisition and maintenance of knowledge to the various supplies generally necessary to conduct
business.
The Appellant has failed to demonstrate the officers were subject to any losses beyond the
chance they might not receive a paycheck in a timely manner. The officers risked no losses in
their alleged venture. This factor weighs in favor of employment.
(v) Advertising. The worker advertises services in telephone directories.
newspapers, magazines, the Internet. or by other methods clearly demonstrating
an effort to generate business.
The Appellant argues the secondary employment program thrives by "word of mouth"
advertising. Additionally, its witness, Mr. Falco, testified the officer's advertising consisted of
''their police car."
Businesses compete for the attention of prospective customers in an increasingly distracted and
noisy society. An independently established business will rarely have no advertising or
marketing of any kind. The Appellant's arguments on this factor miss the mark. The rule
examines the worker's efforts to advertise their alleged business. No persuasive evidence was
introduced to show any of the officers engaged in any form of advertising. The Appellant may
well have heard of the secondary employment program through word of mouth, but this is not
relevant to whether the individual officers took steps to advertise their purportedly independent
business. The testimony regarding the officers' police cars amounting to advertising is similarly
unconvincing. A UPD vehicle is not an advertisement for the individual behind the wheel. The
Appellant has failed to demonstrate the officers advertised their services by a method intended to
generate business. This factor weighs in favor of classifying the officers as employees.
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(vi) Licenses. The worker has obtained any required and customary business,
trade, or professional licenses.
·
The Appellant argues this factor leans towards independence because the officers were certified
police officers "which is the very licensure contemplated" by the unemployment rules.

It is undisputed the officers were duly trained and certified to be police officers. However, it is
their service as an allegedly independent business that is at issue. The Appellant has failed to
demonstrate that having police officer certification is required or customary for a non-municipal
business operating in this field. In fact, Mr. Hansen testified quite the opposite is true when he
stated police officers are prohibited by UPD policy and state statute from independently
providing security services. It stands to reason that if employment as a police officer disqualifies
one from operating an independent business, then police certification is not necessary or
customary licensure for a business owner seeking to operate in this market. Additionally, there
is no evidence the officers obtained a business license. Although not dispositive, such licenses
are usually required by municipalities and are commonly obtained by a truly independently
established business. In total, this factor weighs toward employment.

<ii

(vii) Business Records and Tax Forms. The worker maintains records or
documents that validate expenses, business asset valuation or income earned so
he or she may file self-employment and other business tax forms with the Internal
Revenue Service and other agencies.
The Appellant argues this factor points to independence because the officers are "issued an
annual IRS- I 099 form which in and of itself is a business record." It also argues the officers
have residences where "presumably each officer retains his/her own secondary employment
records."
The Appellant's argument regarding fonn l 099 is without merit. Although this fonn is
commonly associated with independent contractor relationships, the employer issues the
document and it is not necessarily indicative of the workers' efforts to keep business records.
This reasoning has been upheld by the Court of Appeals in Needle. The Court found:
... [T]he Board's reasoning seemed to be that while l 099 forms do support
independence, they are not determinative, particularly where the decision to
provide a 1099 form (rather than a W-2, for instance) has not been shown to have
been made by the [workers] themselves and where there is no other evidence of
documentation, record maintenance, or filings consistent with the operation of an
independent business. The plain language of the rule asks whether the worker
"maintains records" in order to "file self-employment and other business tax
forms with the [IRS] and other agencies." Id. (emphases added). [The employer]
offered testimony that its [workers] were provided 1099 forms and that it did not
know whether its (workers] actually maintained records to track business
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expenses for the purpose of filing "self-employment and other business tax
forms." Thus, other than the passive receipt of the employer-generated I 099
fonns, there was no substantial evidence that the advocates "file(dJ or
maintain[ed] records as a business or pa[id] taxes as a business."
Consequently, [the employer's] contentions-that the Board misinterpreted this
factor and that its determination that the factor weighed against independence was
not supported by substantial evidence-are without merit. We therefore decline to
disturb the Board's determination on this factor.
~

Here, as in Needle, no evidence was introduced to demonstrate the officers maintained any sort
of business records. There was also no evidence regarding whether the filings they made with
the IRS are consistent with those expected from an independently established business. Passive
of receipt of a I 099 does not by itself satisfy this factor. The Appellant's assertion the officers
"presumably" maintained records at their residences is pure speculation without basis in the
record. This factor weighs in favor of employment.
After carefully weighing all the above factors, the officers are not independently established in
their own businesses. The independent contractor test involves more than just counting up the
elements for and against independence. Rather, the substance of the service relationship is
examined. Considering the nature of the services perfonned, the weight of the factors goes
toward classifying the officers as employees because on balance the service lacks the
characteristics of an independently established business.
The Appellant has not met its burden in the first prong of the two-part test for independent
contractors. If the Appellant fails to establish either prong, then the officers cannot be
considered independent contractors. As a result, the officers are employees for unemployment
insurance purposes.
The Utah Court of Appeals has held that if one of the two prongs of the independent contractor
test is not established, then there is no need to analyze the remaining prong. Petro-Hunt, LLC v.
Dep 't of Workforce Servs., 197 P .3d I 07, 116 (Utah App 2008). The Appellant failed to prove
the officers had an independently established business. Consequently, the Board will not address
the issue of control and direction nor the Appellant's arguments directed to this prong.
The Appellant provided much ~ew evidence for the first time on appeal.
The time to have provided this evidence was at the hearing before the Administrative Law Judge.
Prior to the hearing the parties were sent a notice of hearing that included the following
instructions:

~
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READ THE GUIDE TO THE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS
PROCESS online at jobs.utah.gov/appealprepare.html YOU WILL BE
RESPONSIBLE FOR KNOWING AND FOLLOWING THE
INFORMATION.
ABOUT THE HEARING: The hearing is your opportunity to present ALL
testimony and evidence on the issues. The appeal decision will be based solely
on the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing. A written decision will
be sent to you after the hearing. If you file a further appeal of that decision, you
will generally not be allowed to present new or additional testimony and
evidence.
DOCUMENTS: Included with the notice of hearing are documents marked as
exhibits that m~y be made part of the hearing record. Read the documents
prior to the hearing and have them with you at the time of the hearing.
Employer representatives: Ensure that the employer received a copy of the
Notice of Hearing and all documents.
If you have additional documents you want to be considered, you must mail,
fax or hand deliver the documents to the Appeals Unit and all other parties
at least three days prior to the hearing. The documents should only be
printed on one side and not stapled to other documents. The Appeals Unit will
not forward your documents to the other party. Include the appeal case number
on any documents you send in. Documents not provided timely may not be
considered by the judge.
WITNESSES: Before you ask witnesses to participate in the hearing, be sure
you need their testimony. The best witness saw the events and circumstance
you want to explain to the judge. When a witness testifies about what
someone else said happened, this is "hearsay" and is not very helpful in
proving your case. You must arrange for the witness to be available at the time
of the he~ng. Provide the name and telephone number of your witness(es) to
the Appeals Unit prior to the hearing. Essential witnesses who refuse to testify
may be subpoenaed. See the Guide to the Unemployment Insurance Appeals
Process online at jobs.utah.gov/appeals/appealprepare.html for further
details.

IF YOU HAVE ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS ABOUT THE HEARING,
READ THE GUIDE TO THE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
APPEALS
PROCESS
located
online
at
jobs.utah.gov/appeals/appealprepare.html, or call the Appeals Unit at 801526-9300 or 1-877-800-0671.
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The online Guide advises parties how to prepare for a hearing and says,

in part:

Preparation for the Hearing

The hearing before the ALJ is your only chance to present everything relevant
to the case. A record of the hearing will be made, and the ALJ may consider
only the evidence introduced during this hearing. Further review and decisions
on appea] are 1imited solely to the evidence introduced at this hearing.
Take time to prepare for your hearing. Know the issue or issues invo]ved.
Obtain documents that help prove your facts and provide them to the ALJ and
opposing party. Also, be sure to line up witnesses which support your side of
the case. To help you remember what you want to present at the hearing, you
may prepare a simple chart or written summary with the key information you
want to present.
Prepare all evidence and be ready to explain company records, abbreviations,
technical terms, and/or symbols. Do not rely solely upon written statements of
witnesses as part of your evidence presentation. (See Witnesses and
Subpoenas.)
Prepare Facts

Facts, not conclusions, are the basis of a good case. Be prepared to answer the
questions of who, what, when, where, and why. Saying that an employer is
unfair or that an employee is unsatisfactory is a conclusion. Prepare facts that
prove the point you wish to make, and present evidence and witnesses that will
verify the facts asserted at the hearing.
Witnesses and Subpoenas

Gi@

If you need witnesses to help you present your case, contact them immediately
to arrange for their appearance. Be sure they are available to participate in the
hearing by tele.phone. If they are not available to participate, you may be able to
reschedule the hearing. If the witnesses must participate by telephone at another
location, have those numbers available for the ALJ.
Essential witnesses refusing to participate in the hearing or provide essential
documents may be ordered or subpoenaed. A subpoena is a paper which orders
the person to participate in the hearing and/or provide records. You must ask the
ALJ to issue a subpoena at least 3 days prior to the day of the hearing. You must
provide the mailing address of the person you want to subpoena. If a fax number
is available, provide that also. Have this information when you call the Appeals
. Unit.
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Before you ask witnesses to come to the hearing, be sure you need their
testimony. The best witnesses are those who were personally involved in the
events and circumstances which are being explained to the ALJ. When a
witness testifies about what someone else said happened, this is "hearsay''
and is not very helpful in making a decision. "Hearsay" is also any statement,

whether oral or in writing, made by a person who does not personally appear to
testify under oath in the hearing. Hearsay is admissible in the hearing, but is not
persuasive if contested.
No finding of fact or decision may be based solely on uncorroborated, hearsay
evidence. Hearsay evidence carries less weight and credibility than does
firsthand testimony, especially if the other party disputes that infonnation. You
should have the witnesses themselves who made the statement and/or
observations available to testify during the hearing and try not to rely upon
documents or witnesses who have no firsthand knowledge of events. [Emphasis
in original]
The Administrative Law Judge also told the parties, at the beginning of the
hearing, to be sure to present all the evidence they wanted to be considered
during the hearing and that the hearing was the only opportunity they would
have to present evidence.
Department rules provide:
R994-508-305. Decisions of the Board.

(2)
Absent a showing of unusual or extraordinary circumstances, the Board
will not consider new evidence on appeal if the evidence was reasonably
available and accessible at the time of the hearing before the ALJ.
The reason for this rule is that an appeal to the Board is an appeal on the record. That means that
the Board reviews the evidence before the Administrative Law Judge and not new evidence.
Providing evidence after the hearing deprives the other party of the opportunity to cross-examine
witnesses and provide rebuttal evidence, if available. The right of cross-examination and the
right to rebut evidence are important due process rights that must be protected.
Courts and administrative bodies are charged with the responsibility of resolving disputes
between individuals. Parties to a lawsuit or administrative procedure have the right to know that
the dispute will reach finality at some point in time. To ensure that the rights of all parties are
protected, courts and administrative bodies set trials and hearings so that the parties might fully
present any and all evidence and arguments in support of their position. After the hearing or trial
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no new evidence can be accepted except under unusual circumstances as explained in the rule
mentioned above. Although the Board understands that to an inexperienced party the rules seem
overly technical, those rules are necessary. Many if not most losing parties would want a new
hearing to try and present a "better" case. If the Board granted those requests it would
unnecessarily delay and burden the hearing process.
Department rules provide:

R994-403-116e.
Information. ·

Eligibility

Determinations:

Obligation

to

Provide

(I)
The Department cannot make proper determinations regarding eligibility
unless the claimant and the employer provide correct information in a timely
manner. Claimants and employers therefore have a continuing obligation to
provide any and all information and verification which may affect eligibility.
(2)
Providing incomplete or incorrect information will be treated the same as
a failure to provide information if the incorrect or insufficient information results
in an improper decision with regard to the claimant's eligibility.

R994-508-109. Hearing Procedures.

(9) . . . A party has the responsibility to present all relevant evidence in its
possession. When a party is in possession of evidence but fails to introduce the
evidence, an inference may be drawn that the evidence does not support the
party's position.

Gj

Utah appellate courts have consistently upheld the Board's refusal to accept new evidence on
appeal. In Salt Lake Donated Dental Servs. v Dept' of Workforce Servs., 2001 UT App 7, the
employer submitted affidavits to the Board after the Board had issued its decision. The Board
refused to consider the affidavits. The Court of Appeals upheld the Board's decision to not
consider the affidavits stating:
Our supreme court has cited with approval a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit holding that a federal agency did not abuse its discretion in "refusing to
consider new evidence on a petition for reconsideration, because 'if a party were free to reshape
its case, so long as it did so within 20 days after a decision, the administrative process might
never end."' Western Water, LLC v. Olds, 2008 UT 18,, 31, 184 P.3d 578 (quoting Toledo,
Peoria & W Ry. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 462 F.3d 734, 753 (7th Cir. 2006)).
·
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Accordingly, while this is not precisely the situation addressed by rule 994-508-305(2) we do not
consider the untimely affidavits in determining whether the Board's decision was supported by
substantial evidence.
In Swenson, v Dept' of Workforce Servs., 2012 UT App 25 the Court of Appeals took issue with
the Board's reliance on evidence that was not presented to the ALJ or given to the parties prior to
the Board making its determination about the timeliness of Swenson's appeal. However, we do
not reach the issue of whether the Board improperly relied on this new evidence because it made
sufficient findings regarding the filing of Swenson's appeal independent of the new evidence.
Furthennore, those independent findings reasonably and rationally support the Board's
determination that good cause did not excuse Swenson's untimely appeal.
In Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P2d 63 (Utah 1989) the claimant was discharged
for allegedly testing positive for marijuana at work. The employer failed to provide a copy of the
test results during the hearing claiming it was trying to protect the claimant's confidentiality.
The Administrative Law Judge allowed benefits and Grace provided a copy of the test results
with its appeal to the Board. The Board refused to consider the test results on appeal. In
upholding that decision, the Court of Appeals held:

it is undisputed that Mr. Goodale was discharged solely because he tested positive
for illegal drugs while on duty. It reasonably follows that the test results were
crucial to Grace Drilling's burden of establishing that Mr. Goodale was
discharged for "just cause." Grace Drilling was given two opportunities to present
the results and lay the appropriate foundation for receiving them into evidence.
Grace Drilling declined on both occasions, and its post-hearing confidentiality
justification simply is not persuasive as the appeal referee could have taken the
appropriate precautions to protect the confidentiality of the report.
In short, the test results were clearly available at the time of the hearing and the
Board so noted. The Board declined to consider the test results stating to do so
would have deprived Mr. Goodale of the opportunity to rebut or cross-examine.
We agree. Elementary fairness in unemployment compensation adjudications
includes a party's right to see adverse evidence and be afforded an opportunity to
rebut such evidence. See, e.g., Lanier-Brugh, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 761 P.2d
572, 575-76 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Grace Drilling argues that Mr. Goodale could
be given an opportunity to challenge the results if the matter were merely
remanded to the appeal referee to take additional evidence. However, we do not
believe granting parties "three bites at the apple" is consonant with efficient
administrative procedure. Grace Drilling had ample opportunity to present its case
and failed to meet its burden. We hold the Board did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to consider the test results.
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Here, the new evidence presented by the Employer on appeal was available at the time of the
hearing. The Employer has not presented any evidence of extenuating circumstances that would
warrant accepting this new evidence now. The new evidence presented by the Employer on
appeal was not considered in reaching this decision.
The A,ppellant raises other objections and arguments. All have all been considered by the Board
and are found to be without merit.
Where not inconsistent with this decision, the reasoning and conclusions of law of the
Administrative Law Judge are adopted in full.

DECISION:
The decision of the Administrative Law Judge holding that off-duty off-duty police officers are
employees and not independent contractors and to have provided a service for a wage under a
contract of hire for the Appellant, pursuant to the provisions of §§35A-4-204(1 ), 204(3), and 208
of the Utah Employment Secwity Act, is affirmed.

APPEAL RIGHTS:
You may appeal this decision to the Utah Court of Appeals. Your appeal must be submitted in
writing within 30 days of the date this decision is issued. The Court of Appeals is located on the
fifth floor of the Scott M. Matheson Courthouse, 450 South State Street, P. 0. Box I 40230, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84114-0230. The appeal must show the Workforce Appeals Board, Department
of Workforce Services and any other party to the proceeding as Respondents. To file an appeal
with the Court of Appeals, you must submit to the Clerk of the Court a Petition for Writ of
Review setting forth the reasons for appeal, pursuant to §35A-4-508(8) of the Utah
Employment Security Act; §630-4-401 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act; and Rule 14
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, followed by a Docketing Statement and a Legal Brief
as required by Rules 9 and 24-27, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
G)

WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD
Date Issued: December 7, 2016
GH/CN/CE/GG/sp/cp
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing DECISION to be served upon the
following on December 7, 2016, by mailing the same, postage
prepaid, United States mail to:

FUR BREEDERS AGRICULTURAL
COOPERATIVE
8700 S 700 W
SANDY UT 84070-2520
And to the following party via interoffice email:

APRIL LARSEN
DWS FIELD AUDIT
140 E 300 SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111
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I

13, . Were~ J"8q\!lred to ccnrify wl!h company Wltterl lnstJvctlons or JX'C)Ce6ures7

OYES

1i w~i-,oo gtyen ~nlng i,y tti~ flrm7

q

· ·

.

YES
a,,the,Job) . . . - - - - - - . - - - - - - - - - , - , . -

. . . ~ ; v , f m t ~ ~ {e4· tem,a~~
I

. 15.
16.

17,
18,
19.

Old the 11ml reqvlre the w0l1r: be perfams:! In a paiUc:u!ar otdE,- er seqienc:c?

Yf'
I

_pie;'.*~~-~

thb flrm on_a ~tar basis?
Wae . rcQU!red tt>-;l'ltlksdiedul¢ hour$?:. . .·,
'lf
; hoYr many hours per week dkl YDl1 wort?
-----.--~~-~ ·.. ufred7 From:
To:

I .

20,

•

Did
have the light ID perfonn your- services 'lIW8y from, the ftnn's place c t ~
Old Y9(' hive the right ID hire lndlvldual.s W!lhQut the firm's pe-m!SSlon7
.

req

.

.. __,....
_ -. - - -

How were you paid far ','OIi'.work?

□ Hirlr

O salary,

0.cornmt~

_0Bld

.

., '

'

.

'NO
ONO
0N.O_,.

-----

0PleceWo'!'. □ Job .□ Other:

W h o ~ the amOl,rJt pn1 to~?

21.. Dl~ ~ firm PBY or -

you~ expenses?

?f ~ what type(s) ct expenses?

22.

.□ YES

Did cMler lndMclu.als patron slmllar services fer the firm?
.If' Yf$, h?W ~;my?

ii,'-- h 1tilr,;i·w,~llfi•.it <i ~~ yOl,) and 11,e fi~1--· -·
.

24.

If 'rEisi p/eilse ett2K:h a a,py Ifwall,b/d. · ·
Adcfftb1a!CD~

~ ~ --

·. ·.·

,, ,

·.

..

:·-0.~ ,.:. Q~Q

·

·

~ &2 A ;.At✓.t6 . c , ~ ?:1_16;:U', n3AC
k,y4L;J.P2 , .P.~L&e
~ IJ¢ . ~«k<.¥ · .1$1« 77fatf

0.IM~~

.

~•6k:>~
..
.

~

~¾~~~{?41&?1-1

i .•

.

··.·

SOd11I Seo.r1t¥ Number

. . . •,.
8:lr 2a S:• 221?

Telephone

'

1

~

-.... .... ..... ... ..
,:

-

'

.-~ .

\.
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\

~

;

FA Form1-I

\

STATE of UTAH
Department of Workforce Services
Unemployment Insurance

rw:ffl

mws QUE8TIQNNA1Rl; CQR WOfRRS
September15,2!)1~
RYANWA1SON

4-GD211.C-O

·1251 WEST FOX TROT CIRCLE
WEST JORDAN, UT 84084

(@
··-·· .·~..... ----·-··

'

.... -=-· - - ........ - ·

... -

··-

.................. ..._.____ ---· ~ · - - · · · ---·· · -

•

• .... -. - ·

-

..... ··-- , •.. - .....

AquesttQn has been raised regarding servk;es you perfOmted for FBAC durlnfl :tot4, we have a statutx,yy
•
responslbDltr to demrmme ll''ICU are an emp~ cavered by unempk>Vment ~ Please answer the following
CiUastfOnS •rd return th1s form ytlU,ln 7 days..

'

Information regarding Iha ftnn for which you performed this service

PART l:

SJ'Xd.,c,'+f

,

1.-

DesC,r1beyouradMlyat1heabaVe~

2.

De5a1be 1n detdJ tt1e t)l)e(s> oi!9k performed br you far the Rnn:
Did you wort In Utah?
• lffYES
D"~
When wa&1hlswariprfonned?
.
Begiuing
Date: - - - - 1
• • •
•• ,
•

Ed,gDat!:

(__ PART.II: _ •~ronnat1on regarcf!_ns aelf.employment
Tba fo&,w/n/J tpJeflt/on8an, flltltl to tlstarm/1111 llyo,r hlVfl ln1lft thl thJtbltm andh/lWI
ta/tell 1M na:estllll'I IIIBp_ t, estalJ1l6lt your own~ Wile "IM"/lnotapplk:a/,lrJ.

t.
4.

-----,tt:.<--=------------

Whatlsthenametlyaurblsness?
Do yaz haveycurown place rl buslna?

0 YES

It'YES:

i?

NO

(..) Do you havathe r1ghtm ctsgnatethep!a where ttiewodcwm be peJfcrmed?

.,···:-.:-· ._ ·. ·t)~_~fStJt~~.tr.,£11het. .[reQJ~~11gt~

Oves

□ No

. lJ.YJ.1-.

QNO

(c) Jf,ou do work tDffl l10me, do ycu clalm a palt r/ygll? home es an expflllSe on lQlr

1ndMdual .1nconte tax rewm? .
~

s.

9,
10,

EfRo.

What kind{$) o f ~ tods,·rnatemts and &Oppleswn p-ovlded byyau? - - - ~ - - - . . . . - By the ffrml

G.
7.
&

□ YES

.

~

-·- --

Did you provide a !Xmtle5S lnYolce to the flr_m fQI' yous- ~ 7
! 0 YES
Dld ycu regufarfy psfann slmflar work far othes1 as an ~entccnb'adm? .
0 YES
Were you ll!lqUlled to wortmdqsf\lefy for lhJs ftrm?
•
YES
Coukf
a pratfct rM:s or a tQsj as a n:sg\t
irsfependent"buslness ~ · 0 YES
Do,cu pleasaspedfyhowycu
~ your :iemces?actven.tse:
.'
0_
yes_ __
It''t'S,
_ _ _ _ __.;..._ _ _ _ _,,_

you -

D

otymu

m:t~

~

140 Eust 300 Scuth ♦ 5d \aka-Ctr, \Jtn.h ♦ 841U
(8D2.)152H231cg\10nf l=(IU)szs..n:tl

. flqlg/~81'=

Aprr,ur1~r,A/nri:ll'S ~ Nsl.WtJlt

~
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ADDENDUM F
STATµS QUESTlONNAIRE FORWQRKERS {contfnu&d) .
I

l
1

11,. Have VOil c;ttalned any required ~ c:cunty or Ct)' tmJneS$ lleenSe7
It'Y£S, whk;t1 kind af lic!n!ie7:

12.

.

0o you matntmn recxrds or dCJC:UmentS b:> Pl'0YC tna:,me and expenses for lnCDme tax pu'~
lfYl!S, Wtlldl tllX rorms? {e.g, Self-emplaymenttax

PART HI:

JP YES

ONO

QYES

QNO

· lnfonnatlon concemlng the worklng·relatlonahlp between you ani:1 the1flnn

Ons ~o
0
14. Were-ycu glYl:fl tralnlng by the firm?
· ·
Cl.VJ:~-.. . . .rnis; what·~~ tral~ (e.~ fo!Tliaf ctasstooin or~tiie-joo) ' ' . _--_._-·_·_·__.. - 13,

Were yov required to oomply with COlllP<S1Y wrttten lnslroctlol'\S or procedures?

15.

Did the firm rcqvtre the wo:1( be po, ru. med In a pa~ r order or sequence?

Did you hM the right 1D petform Y0lt' servkzs away rrom 1he firm's plaal or bu.sine$?
17. Did you heve the rtgt,ttr, h i r e ~ wlthout the firm's penn!s?ion?
1f. Old ycu i,er!on,:t servlals for thls firm on a regular basls?
19, · Were-you requiredtoW0ttscheduled hbtirs7
If~ 00N many-hours per Wi:e1c did you wor1<l
What hOl,ll'S we-a requ\Jtld? From: - - - - - To: _ _ _ _..,..

YES
YES-

16,

•

2.0. ~ were you paid for yo., wtma ·
Houri)'
Salary
Commission

1B

0

O

QYES

Pt:

ONO
ONO

HNO

aNo
Q,NO

OBid OPiere Work· 0 Job OOIJler:

Wlto determined tjie amovnt ~ to you?

Dru ~

2.1.

Did the ftrm pey or reimburse you far expenses?
rt ns, what lype(s) of expenses?

22.

Old c,ttiei- lndM;luals P=ft,rm s1m11ar servrces for the flnn?
. ff YES, how many?
..

23.

1s·t;t,ere a wrltt!!ri agreement CK contract~ you end the firm?
If~, p/e/J$C att;Jdl a copyIf{M!J}Jble.

24.

Ad<lltlona I comments:

..

Telephone

Exhibit: 61

0YES

□ NO

UYES

ONO

.
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ADDENDUM F
FAFomrl-r

STATE ofOTAB

m:1!12

DepartmentofWorkforeeSemces
Unemployment lnlllnUlce .
STA)VS auE§J10NNAIRE FOR WORKERS

Septembsf14,2015
KYLELOWllfER.

. .f.002814-0

424Z W. 11475 S.
SOUTH JORDAN, UT 84095

• I

t

I

•

~ .. •

•

•

Aquestion has been raised regarding servfces you performed for FBAC dll'lng 2014. We have a statut:ory
~mty to determine r yov are an employee covered 1,/ unemp!ofment 1nsurane2. Please enswer the ronowrng
Cluestfons and return this fof:t? wJtttln 7 days.
·
·
·

l

PART I: · lnfonnatton regarding the flnn for which you performed th!s aervl~
J
1. ~F.llfadMtyattheabovebirsfAeE
;t: ~ s~~'..l.., W~"YlS

== '.

iiw,w;;,.;

:z.

1
h,o'to&i5s a~. ttro =.c 9 ~ § . . i . ~
Desat,e Ill petaD Iha ~s). a t ~ ~ br. you b' lh! ftrm: : Sz.GCA. r:ff.;,
..
Dld you wark1n Utah?"
l!fYES ONO
When was thli ~ ~ Beginning Date: I,,. I - ['{ ·
· edng Date: II- V,,. I'(
.
.

f PART II:

Information regarding &elf-employment
71,e following qmst/ollll 1118 llllt!d trl detarmlnB tryw /amJ lffllde the dtJdJJ/on and haw
·taken tile fllJDISGrylllapl to tJ8bl/Jlllb YOllf own blalnBll&r Wdtc, ••"Ifnot app/kable,,
3. Whatts tho name or~bldn•
4. . oo vou have your own place of business?' OYES
81io
lfYES:
(~) Do~ have the llpbt ID ds1gnate the plat'e where the d wlll be performed?
□ YES
(b) Do you have~ rer\t/lease, utlbties or othtrn,jafar n,;umng expmtse that l'l1ust .:.ons

NIA

..
...

bepald?

.

•

•

.

.

(c) Ir you do wort fran heme, do yeti dalm a part ct your home as an a,cpm$U on yr,Jr

lndMduaf lntcme tax retum7

! .

5,

Whafldmf(s) of equf~ IXlcfs, rMbJfals anc(supplJes\Wl-e ptOWded byyau?
Bf ttie fhn1

6.
7.
8.

9.
10.

·

Nf&.

□ YES

f
ONO

ONO.
.OHO

_{0_f_,u_______

.

DYES

Did you PRPAda a bushs ~ tu the nnn fer your Str\lk:25?
Dld ~u regUlarfy perfol!h stmtlatworie for otflers • an tndependent mnblctor'l
.
Were you required to wonc ~ far1hfs ftrm? ·.
·
·
•
~d Y_Cu A9ffze a proft or nsks of a I«. e1 a ~ afyour ln?,,P,sndent ,business~?
Do ycu advet\fse ya:sr servk:eS? .
.
.. . . .

O~

0 YES

OYES

0 VES

(3110

[?'No

[31to
. g'NO

[9'HO

If'YES,ptessestmyhow~~ · - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1i0 fa 300 Saudi ♦ Sdt Lake ctr,~ • 8411.1
(801} 52H23! opt!on 8 fax: (801) 5ZH236
A prwd/11S11brafAm«fal'I ~Ntllwott
6quti()ppartu,/ty~

.

I
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ADDENDUM F
STATUS QUc8110NNAfRE FOR WORKERS (continued)

:IL

HM yau ~ any required Su\te, a:n.mty er 0Ly b~ness i:ense7 .
II YES, whlch ldnd ofllcense?;

12.

Do )'Oil rnalntafJl recxxds or documents to pn,w TncmM and expenses far lnc:ome tax pt!rpases?
Jr YES, Whl~ la)( formal {~ Self-employment tsx

PART RI:
13,

ij]ves

·information con1?9rnlng the working relatlonshlp between you and the

b

Wet! VDU requtn:,cf to o;irnptyw!th c:ampany WdUen lnstrUctlcns er pmcedures?

- 14.-Wereyou gtveii"ti:alrt1ng'6"Ufellrm?

· ·- ·· - · -

· ·--·

• · ••

YES

~w••

•

••••••

~

--l3 Y1S-- f31io· · ·· ·

.tfYES, what Jdnd aftrafnlng? (e.g. formal ctassroom oron-the-job)

15, Did lf1e flmi requh the wort be 1'SfDrmed In a partfcUfar crder er sequence?
11. Did l'OU hM me right to perform Vo\11' senm away flan the nnn's ptam of business?
17, Old vr,,, ha" the light to hn lndMduaJs wlthQut the firm's~?
18. Dkf l'OU perform BVk.15 Yer this nnn en a regular basis?
19. Were l'DU required to wort 5ttiedufed hcur57
lfYES, haW many hours ~weekcld you wadc1
Whathour.swnrequhd? From: _ _ _ _ TD: _._ _ __
20.

Ons

Oves
□ YES

bvs
OYES

How were you pa~ fer your work?

.[il'itou,ty D Salary DCOmm1ssfon DBld OPlece ~ork OJob . DOther;:
WhQ deb:nalned the a/nO\Ut paJd mYoU?
r.. 491'\,, & oU •
21.

Did the flrm pay or retmbwse YoU fa: scpenses?
If ns, whattype{s)decpenses?

22.

Did QUU!r fndMduals ~ slmllarservm rorthe flnn?
If~, nawrnan~
~

2;1.
·

Is theft! a writbm agreement or CXK1baCt ~ you and the firm?
If YES, p/ea$tJ alladl a a,py ll8Y4llable.

r· ~:r t:tv

'.m~~

~ 7;f=112,~;
+lu . LM!t-G:L

24. .Addlbna!Cgnmns

af

. .

m~i:_

~~b
__ ~ '::fbY.~~,,;t
__

SodBI SeaJrlly Number

R1?, .. 5'20 ' 1 'l!\3

I
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~

ADDENDUM. F
FA FomrU

. STATE ofllTAH
Depara.ne1;1t of Workforce Services
Unemployment Insurance

l'ffl 1/fJ

I

IIAM QUESTIONNAIRE FOR WORKERS

·September os. 2015

ZACHARY BENCH

4-002814-0

SD2.B W GRAND·VfSNI PEAK DRJVI!

RlVERTONi UT 84096

A ~ has been raised regant1ng·mces you pecfl:rined for P8AC during 2014... We have a'statu\'Orf
·
responslbfllty tD determine f yau are en employee mvered by unemployment 1nsurant2.- P.lease answer the rollowlng
questions ard ntum this form Wfthrn 7 days.
·

PART I:

ln~rmatfon regarding the flim for which you performed this service

2,

Desx1be -,wrac:l1vly at the 8ba¥e buslnes

z.

Deso1b6 In deta'!l the type(s) a t ~ byycu fer the firm:
. Did ycu wor1c In Utah? • •EfYES . ·· Q NO
.
~'WIS Ull5 \Wlic~edl Beginning t>ate:
Z,o)

..

J

1 PART II: · · ~ - - - n g eeff.:emplo,me'nt

M

- - .- - ' TIM follo'Wlnilqtlfl$tltJn$MJ ,_,,tod«snnlneHyr,u~~,,,_ thlltl«:l#lan ~ /lavtl ·

.

~lll10flllRIY.,.,,~....,,
bu!i1ness? ...pJJt,I
,
you
your
af.bustnes-s? O
efNo

tllkm
3.

·

tit. . .

...&v,\,;a;;i:;;rll ,i,•... v1'+--·.- - - - - - - . .
~
Enti\9 Date: . - - -

basfwlT. Mlle f f l " l f n o t ~

.

Whet ls the nime r:lyour

haw
own pface
YES
·
·
· ·
UYES:
.
(a) Co you have the nght to designate the pfa0e ~ the wort Will be performed?
0 YES
(b) ea you hiNe btl&lness ,emtlsse, utllffles orothE!'regular racumnu e,cpense tf1at must
: bepa(d7. ..
· · ~(.t) lfyaudowatt,amhqme,doyouddnapartcfyourhomeesane,qx:nseonyout
QYES
lndMduallnolffle.retum?
•
5, What ldnd(s) of e q ~ t0o1s,'mata1a11 and~ were provlds:I by you? ....;V~:1'~6)11-1"

4.

Do

DYES

r-,J.?~...-------

By the film?

fbeP

;

bl

=

IJd ym1 prtMde a business tnvolo, to the firm far ycur SBMCeS?
JES
.7.. Dtd you regularty pafamt s1m1111.' wr;rk tor qtlm as an tndependerit.axilrattor?
.
; [3"YES
8, Wse yoa rsi4red,tD WOtt a,c!WilVefY for this tnh7 · '. ·
·
· ! YES
·9; · ·01Uld
or rlslcs of a ioss ~ result.of your Independent busll'less ~ . • . □
&.

10.

you-~-prcflt

0

Do )'OU adveflfm yc(D' 56M::es?

'

•'• .. • •I

•

' '.:

• • • ; • • ...

0

ItYE5r-pJase~hQWY(Kladve!1:lse: -.~·· - - - - - - - - - - . ----...
•.

I•

t

..

I•::

:

I

I

,.

140 Emi:300 sa..ilh ♦ Soltlm Qty, Utldl ♦ 841U
(801) !12M2SS c~ 8 ~ (801) 52H231
Aj,md rnembercf..tmsb~ ~ Nslwt:!lk

.EqUal~S~.:.=

•. ,, ..;.•.·,

... .. .

-....:.

. ..
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ADDENDUM F
STATUS QUESTJONNAJRe FOR WORKERS (contlna&d) .

1L

H,

:0 YES

Have ya.i obtained any ~Ired stm!, Q:,unty ~r cty business Ucense? ·
If YES,~ kind of Dcense?:

·

·-:::-;r--

gg .yw imrnwn ~ or doonnenb"to p~ lncoole a~d ~~me tax purposes?
rnes, Wflldl tax tonns7 (e.g. se1r-cn,p1oyment tax
SM 4C:: c.. , !P ~" · :

iives.

QNO

1

PART Ill:

b1fonnatlon

~ncemlng- the working flfflltfom•hlp betwoen you p",nd ~ flm,.

13. Win you requtred to IXIT1'1y wftft .c:,mpaNf Wliten Instructions o r ~
14.

QYES

rrns, what.l:llld ofba!nlng7 (e.g. formal dassltlanoroo-th---job)
15.

16.
17.

11.
it.

~

Ons ld'f(o

were ycu given tra1n1ns 17,' the flnn7 .
Oki the firm l'CQUlre the work be P!tfOrmed In! partkular orckr ex sequence?
Did )W-NNI the nghtto. l)e!form ycur seivlces
away from the flnn's place of bu5ne.ss?
.
Dld)'DU lvwethe 11ghttn 11Jre !ndlvlduals WJlilouttheftrm'~ pem,1$Slon7
Old )'CU ~ ~ for1hls nm, os:i a reguar basis?
Were you rtlQIJfred to wm s::heduled hours"I
Ir 'l'.5, hciw many hotn per week did YoU WDl1\7

·Wv:

~

□ No

□ ves

l}-NO

□ YES

(31'6

Ons 8'HO

What hours were ~red7 From: _ _ _ _ _ To: - - , . - - - - -

20,

~owr you paid fcx- YQur wort?
[}ffour1y

D

O

OBid DPiece WOl'k DJob DOther.

Salary
Ca'llmlsslon
'Mio det2ml!ne.1 the amoont paid tn ygu?

21,

Oki the firm pay or relmbur,c you for expen$eS?

0YEs

~

~

□ No

.,□. 'YE$

B'No

If YES, what tyil!(s) of exim;es7
U.

Oki c!her lndMduals per1brnrslmllllr servw ~ the flrm7
If YeS, haw many?
?
.

'

.

·· . . ·23,.. · · · I s . ~ ~ ~ ~-~ ~ ~ y o o . a n d ~ '•
If m, P,Jeasr! 6itadl a
flvallable. . ." . . .
.

apy

24.

.. -

.

Additional Comments:

SOclal Seall1ty Number

@?►-~,f-,tz:s
~ your m1m11

•

Teli:phone .

.. :
1
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ADDENDUM F
FAFmnf.J
,wv:J/'11

·

STATE of UTAH .
Deparn.neut of Workforce Services
U11employment Insurane;e

STATUS qugnoNNAJRE FOB wg~
Septsmber 09, 2015

. ~2814-0

.MAffHEW HERlTACi& ·
4553 w. 6165 S.
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84118

ra~~

Aquestion-has-been
Sfflmya(l1)erfortneit ft!t.Pi.lc:ctcsit,g 2014. W..Lhr.ie ~ stmul;xY
:.
responslblBty t a d ~ 1f ycu are on employee covered by unemp1oyment·1nsurance. Please answer the rollowtng

questrons and rettm this rorm Within 7 days.
PART I:

z.
•

..

Information regarding the flnn for which you performeci thls fflY)ce ·

~ In dataD thetype{s) of wa;ri r.eratnled byyoufor1heflrm:
O~)'t1tl wmt In Utah?

~ ~:~~~:~

[PARro; -~~ ~pr-din~

..
tl--=t::::.11:u....
e-i...
'\-j..,___--::...-------

Stl-~ . '·· : ·:·

8YES ONO

Beginning Date:

··

·

•

t9f /ti I Pi

..

.

Ending Dab:;

"

.

IZ.ill /1~ .

to...,_

I

11m''ltJ/low/dg tplllslll,ilt6 a,e atJd
11-,ouhlliw INdlltho d«:b;fon and haw, .
taltmt111111ftlllirarJ'_,.m _,,..,, ,a,,rownbullnw. Wl1l8 W4"lfnotappllmb/A
3.
4~

.,

-~P... tff\:u,.,....;.wc,Mg.--.-~-----+-----

Whatls~nameofyourbusfness?
1>..
Do~ hffl.yourown pm of busness? Q YES

5lNO
lfYES:
(a) Co you have the riQtt to designaw tt1Q place wh8'B 11,e ~ wm be petformed?
.
· (It).~ VDU have business ,em/lease, uWltie!i or other n=t.JUlar remmg expmse that must

..... - ~

.
. .
{C] Ifyo1idowoitfrO~home,CIOyoudalm a pstofyw;,ur~as~ ~~ vcur
Individual lna)me tax return? .

•

'

"' NO

ONO
Q,fto ..

S.

What ldnd(s) d equtpnS\t, tools,~~ supplies~ ~dad byyau? .._.l).,._ON,--._~-----

6.

Bytheflrm?
Did you provide a buptness lnvobl. to.th" ftffl\ ~rVQUr services?
Did }QI '89ulmtf,Perfonn smllar work for others as aft ln~entc,~

G,
..

DYES
g'YES
OTES

7,

,·a,·
9,
10.

I

weie ygu requ1rec1 to wmt ext-for tt11s iirtn"i' · .... .... ·
·_
.
c.otJ!d you· reaDze i prut or rlsJtr tit' irlm, an flS1!t of~.Jndependent busfnes1 ~
Dci~·aaverttic: yodf ~ ? ·,-: ' · -.: = •: -t • ·, •• .. • • • • ·
• ··
•
lfYES, pleasle spedl'V,how ycu ~ ' • · •
• .

. .

:

.. . .

... '

.

. ..

.

YES

..i

ONO

fiJ Yl!S DNO
· DYES • Ii No
. •. •ifY.ES.. . El NO •
• g YES -· BJ No
i

+ Seli ukit Qty, l,tlBh ~ tt111
(801)52H235pptml fax:(80Q52MZSI

1-10 eest3CO South

A/J(Otld,,.,,,._.ofN1Jl!lial'5 WcrifDlm Nswotk
Equal~~

______.._f'·•,····---···,.;·.·.:·• .,

•

•• I

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Exhibit: 70

67

ADDENDUM F
STATUS QUESTIONNAIRE FOR WORKERS {eo~nued)

U,
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.

l)o
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FALCO

Okay and Dale probably stay right (Unintelligible) are probably gonna say the same
thing so.

RAWLINGS

Be Mr. Hansen.

JUDGE

Okay. So Mr. Hansen will be leaving. Let me know when he's gone.

FALCO

He's gone.

JUPGE

Alright Thapk you. Mr. Falco, uh,just to begin with can you, uh,just briefly swnmarize
the nature of the Appellant's business for me?

FALCO

Uh, we manufacture animal feed and deliver it to our and supplies to our ranchers that are
basically the owners of the coop.

17
18

JUDGE

Okay.

19

FALCO

And all of them are typically mink ranchers here in the state of Utah and southern Idaho.

JUDGE

Okay and the Department, uh, - the individual's with whom the Department made a
determination to be, uh, considered employees that subjected the Appellant to \lllemploy
- unemployment contrib\rtions are listed in the records here that we've gone through on
Exhibits - it's the include, exclude list that begin on Exhibit 21 through - it's marked as
Exhibit Number 27. In looking at that list of, uh, workers that were included, that were
designated as the security officers, did each one of those individuals provide services to,
uh, the - to your organization in the years 2014 and 2015 as security officers?

FALCO

Um, I would have to look up which years that they were here. I'm sure that some of
them were not here both years.

JUDGE

And I'm not asking whether they were there for both years, but for either year that the

2
3
4

s
6
7
8
9

10
It
12
13

14
JS
16

\..

20
21
22
23
24

25

26
27
28
29

3Q
31
32

designated on these reports. I just need to know if you're - if there were any of these
individuals the Deparbnent found to be security officers during these years if you are
contesting that and - and - and believe that some of them never provided any services
for your organization in those years that are list ...

33

34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45

FALCO

There was a I 099 issued on them. They provided service for the 1099.

WOGE

Okay and did the organization, uh, your organization pay them for the services that they
provided?

FALCO

Obviously if we issued a 1099 we did.

JUDGE

Okay and, um, did they provide services as security officers then?
9
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2
3

FALCO

Um, we consider it more of a police presence in the area.

4

JUOGE

5
6
7
8

Okay. So, generally if- if police are- are providing services they're paid by the police
department or the organization they- they work for. Why were you paying them if they
were acting as police officers?

FALCO

We asked for some additional police coverage because we had been struck by Animal
Rights terrorist groups in the past We had~ building bum down in 1-997 and we had
AFL writings on our buildings in '94. We had, uh, mink release - or research ranch in
early 2000. And so, we have had additional police presence on the property, um, for the
last, uh, several years off and on and around the parameter.

9

.

10
11

12
13
14
15

JUDGE

Okay, but do you know why the police didn't-didn't do that as part of their job duties as
police officers?

FALCO

Well, we - we asked for additional police coverage because, uh, the Unified Police is the
one that does most of this thing. We're county on a island all by itself so, we're not part
of Sandy City, we're not part of Midvale so, we're basically county. Midvale uses the
Unified Police, but they're also contracted with Midvale. So, we don't get a lot of police
coverage because of the situation with our property.

JUDGE

Okay. So, did the Unified Police require you to pay them for their services then?

FALCO

Yes if we wanted some additional coverage during offliours they asked us-they wanted
to bill us by hourly. They charged us by hour.

28
29
30

JUDGE

Okay and so, when you paid. these individuals did you pay them directly or did you pay
the Unified Police Department?

31
32

FALCO

Um, we paid the individuals directly. They provided a list of the people who - that were
assigned and asked us to write the checks to them.
·

JUDGE

Okay. Uh, so, when did this, uh, arrangement-this first begin this arrangement between
your company and - and Unified Police Department to provide these additional services?

36
37
38

FALCO

You know I'd have to look up the exact year when it started.

39

JUDGE

Okay.

FALCO

Like I said we've used 'em off and on for several years.

JUDGE

So, all of the workers that provided these services did they all go through - did you go
through the U - Unified Police Department to obtain the services of all of these
individuals?

16
17
18
19

20
21

22
23
24
25

:-

26

iv

27

33
34
35

40
41
42

43

44
45
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2
3
4
5

FALCO

Um, the Unified Police officers are the - or Unified Police Department are the ones that
assign the officers. They have their own system that, uh, Ken Hansen can describe to
you. We have no - no idea which officers would be assigned or who would be over here.

6

JUDGE

But I guess - I guess my question was did you ever contact individuals individually and
ask them to provide services as security or a police ...

FALCO

Well, we went through the Unified Police.

JUDGE

Okay.

13
14

FALCO

We wanted, uh, police car presence if possible.

15
16

JUDGE

Okay. Alright and, um, is it your understanding that were - were there any individuals
that provided security or police presence to your knowledge that were not employees of
the Unified Police Department?

FALCO

Uh, we, in the past, have used a security finn off and on.

JUDGE

But I mean of these individuals that are included in this audit for the years 2014 and 2015
that are included in the act - include, exclude list. Are you aware of anyone that was not
an employee of the Unified Police Department?

25

FALCO

No.

26
27

JUDGE

7
8
9
10.

~

11
12

17
18
19
20
21

22
23
24

28
29
30
31

(I

Okay. Um, what detennined or bow was it determined how much, uh, they would be
paid?

FALCO

They had a set rate of $30 dollars an hour.

32

JUDGE

When you say they who do you mean?

33
34
35

FALCO

Unified Police.

36

JUDGE

Okay.

FALCO

That we contact and told us that that was their rate.

JUDGE

Okay and, um, to your kndwledge - now the Utah Employment Security Act and - and
the rules pertaining to the t,ct give some guidelines in determining whether or- whether
or not someone is an indeP,endent contractor or an employee and, uh, with respect to the
rules that pertain to the Adt that gives these guidelines I'll be asking you questions, uh,
about these specific areas ~at the rules pertaining to the Utah Employment Security Act,
uh, they should be looked ~tin deter- making this detennination. Now I understand that

37
38
39
40
41
42

43
44
45

I

11
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some may be more relevan than others, some may not be relevant at all, but I'm going to
go through them. I'll - as e Judge I need to determine whether or not it's relevant or
not, uh, but I wanna ask you about each of these points and, uh, and then we' 11 gQ from
there. But, uh, to your kriowledge do - did any of these individuals, um, while they
provided services for your! organization; to your knowledge, did any of them have any
separate place of business r,ch as a separate office space or - or a store front for which
they provided security services Qr security officer services?

1
2
3

4
5

6
7
8
9
10

11
12

FALCO

Um, Ken should be able to testify to that I wouldn't be aware of that other than the fact
that they all work for the lnified Police and I would a assume that they had space there.

JUDGE

Okay. I was asking more about an independent business rather than their employment
relationship with Unified Piolice Department. Are you aware of they- whether they had,
um, any other place of business.
·

FALCO

We didn't - we didn't) ally interact with the officers so, I wouldn't be aware of
anything.

JUDGE

Okay. Now did the o cers carry firearms when they provided services to your
organization?

FALCO

Um, I assume so. Like Is ·d they were here usually in off hours so, I'd never really saw
them very often.

J1JDGE

Okay. Are you aware of any tools or equipment or supplies· or facilities that the
1
individual workers were quired to pay for themselves in order to provide their services
to your organization?

FALCO

Um, Ken-Ken would

JUDGE

Okay.

FALCO

Answer that que - can Ter 'cuz, um, like I said ...

JUDGE

Well, no ...

FALCO

... we want - we just w: ted a police presence ...

JUDGE

Okay.

FALCO

... around our area.

JUDGE

When they provided thei services were they wearing Unified Police Department, uh,
uniforms or were - did tli.ey wear something else?

13

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

2s
26
27
28
29
30
31

rI

.

h1 e to probably do that.

.

32

33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45

I

(i;;
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I

FALCO

Um, our- our understanding would be is that they would be in unifonn and with a police
car, but I'm not sure if it was required by Unified Police that they keep their uniform on.

JUDGE

Okay. Alright, um, did your organization prevent them or prohibit the workers from
providing similar services to other organizations?

FALCO

Nope as far as I know they do it for other organizations.

JUDGE

And do you have any firsthand or personal knowledge as to whether any of the workers
actually did provide similar services to other organizations or other clients?

FALCO

Other than Ken's testimony in the last meeting I really...

JUDGE

Okay.

FALCO

... have no personal knowledge of it.

JUDGE

Okay. Alright. Uh, do you have any lmowledge as to whether or not these individuals
can experience a profit or a loss in providing ser - their services to your company?

FALCO

Um, I suppose they're always at risk at loss if we were not to pay them, but as most
independent contractors would be; but other...

24
25

JUDGE

Is there a risk that you wouldn't pay them?

26
27

FALCO

Well, hopefully not, but, you know ...

28
29
30
31

JUDGE

Okay.

FALCO

... ifl wouldn't.

32

JUDGE

Alright.

FALCO

But that would be an area for Ken to talk about not me.

JUDGE

Well, I - I'm just asking you the questions and, uh, I under - I understood if, uh, if you
don't-if you can't answer it or don't have the knowledge to answer it I understand that
so.:.

40

FALCO

41
42
43

My dad was a paint contractor so, his only risk at loss was when people didn't pay him
so.

JUDGE

But didn't he as a paint contractor have to pay for- have his own expenses, uh, and that
-if his income didn't exceed his expenses he would experience a loss that way?

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

~

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

20
21

22
23

"

33
34
35
36

37
'38
39

44
45
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FALCO

No ...

2
3

JUDGE

Even if they did pay.

4
5

FALCO

... he - be billed all that to his customers.

7
8

JUDGE

Okay.

9
10

FALCO

I mean to me that's the way a lot of hourly people do it.

11

JUDGE

But it - it needs to be a distinction because any - even an employee if, uh, if the
employer doesn't pay them if it's clear employment, employee relationship they're not
paid, uh, they experience I guess yo_u could ex - but Pm talking about, um, a profit or a
loss because they are an independent business with expenses and - and, uh •..

(j

12

13
14
15
16
17
18
19

FALCO

My dad was an independent business person and his only way of suffering loss was if
they didn't get paid by their customer.

JUDGE

Alright. Do -to your knowledge did any of the individuals advertise their services as an
independent contractor security officer or police presence?

22
23

FALCO

Like I said we wanted a police presence so, the advertisement to us was their police car..

24

JUDGE

Any other form of advertisement as an independent contractor that you 're aware of?

25
26

FALCO

That would be Ken's area again that he would have to answer not me.

28
29

JUDGE

Um, okay. You mean Ken Hansen?

30

FALCO

Yeah.

ruDGE

Okay. I thought you said Ken (unintelligible) and I was confused.

34
35

FALCO

Oh no. Ken Hansen.

36

JUDGE

Okay. Alright, um, to your knowledge did any of these individuals have a business
license to operate a business as a - a security firm or a security officer?

39
40
41

FALCO

Again, we were asking for a police presence so, to us having a police, urn, license was
enough for us.

42

JUDGE

Yeah, but that's not ...

FALCO

We don't. ..

20

"'

21

27

31
32

33

37

~

38

43

44
45
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JUDGE

... that's not the questic;m.

FALCO

... we don't routinely ask people that we do business with to provide 'em with- send us a
copy of their business license so, you would have to ...

WDGE

So, your answer is you don't know?

8
9

FALCO

Aseparate business license or not.

10
11
12
13

JUDGE

Okay.

FALCO

Our - the only thing that we were concerned about was that they were license police

2

3
4

s
6
7

~

officers.

14

15

JUDGE

16
17
18
19

Okay. Um, do you have any knowledge as to whether the individuals kept, wn, records
for tax purposes, um, in order to file their taxes, uh, as an independent contractor or as a
self-employed or - or - or a business?

FALCO

Um, when you receive a 1099 you gotta be able to file your tax return. As a tax preparer
any time you receive a 1099 it's gotta be reported so, you - uh, obviously they had tQ
have some kind of records or documentations.

JlJDGE

But do you have any personal knowledge of that whether they were keeping any records
for- for tax purposes other than the 1099 you're talking about?

FALCO

Uh, preparing taxes in the past with other people I would assume that any in - any
individual that receives any kind of 1099 would keep tax records to file taxes.

JUDGE

I'm not asking for assumptions though. I'm asking for any personal knowledge and I
understand that you may - you may argue that ...

FALCO

I didn't interact with ...

JUDGE

... how ...

FALCO

I didn't interact with any of these individuais that, um, had the police presence here so, I
wouldn't know.

JUDGE

Okay and that's all I need. If you don't know that's all I need to know. And I understand
what ma - may not be like~y that you would know, but if you did know I would wanna
know that so.

FALCO

I don't know.

JUDGE

Alright. When, uh, these individuals provided services, uh, to your organization were

20
~l

22
23
24
25

26
27

28
29
30
31
32

~

33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

42
43

44
45
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they required to follow instructions about how to provide these services frqm your
organization?

2

3

FALCO

Nope.

JUDGE

Okay and did they receive any training on how to provide the security officer or - or
police services to your company?

9

FALCO

No not from our company.

IO
11

JU:OGE

Um, were they required to perform their jobs in eme - any certain pace or sequence with
the, uh, Appellant, the company tell them where they needed to be, where they needed to
move throughout the time they provided the services and so forth?

4
~

6
7

8

12

13

~

14

FALCO

No.

JUDGE

Okay and, um, okay. Was there any understanding as to whether the individuals needed
to provide the service them.selves or if they were ill could they have someone substitute
for them?

FALCO

Again since we didn't know who was assigned we wouldn't know. We just asked for
certain hours of off coverage when we weren't around on a random basis. So, our
assumption would be is that somebody would be here, but since we had no control over
who we don't know how that would work. You'd have to ask Ken how that would work.

JUDGE

But I'm asking from the Appellant's point - from your company or your organizations
point .of view, wn, when you entered into an agreement to have individuals provide a
service through the Unified Police Department were you -was it-was there any kind of
place in that if that person couldn't make a shift that they themselves could have someone
come in or would it have to be another Unified Police Department employee to come in
and provide that service?

33

FALCO

No there's nothing from us. As a matter of fact if they ...

34
· 35
36

JUDGE

Okay.

37

FALCO

... missed a day we probably just wouldn't have got the billing for that day, but no three
was nothing required by us.

40
41
42

JUDGE

Okay. So, who was it that - that billed you or you received a invoice or billing from to
detennine who worked and who needed to be paid? How did you lmow that?

43

FALCO

The Unified Police Department provided us with the name.

nJDGE

Okay.

15
16
17
18
19
20

21
22
23
24.
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26
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28
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30
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~
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FALCO

And the hours.

JUDGE

Okay. Um, did the same individuals provide services 'on a regular basis or was it, uh,just
here and there as needed throughout the year?

FALCO

It was here and there as needed and as far as I know not an indi - single individual
provided, uh, the majority of the service.

nJDOE

I'm sorry you said a single individual. I'm ...

FALCO

No. As far as I know not a single.

JUDGE

Okay - okay. Now who or what determined the hours that these individuals worked?

FALCO

Um, at first we would give. some random homs and days and then the Unified Police said
they had some type of program that could do some random hours and days for us SQ, we
kinda turned it over to them.

20
21
22

JUDGE

Okay. Alright. So, were there certain -did- did the Appellant, did your organii.ation
need 24 hour a day services?

23
24
25
26
27
28
29

FALCO

No. This was mostly when no one was around the property.

JUDGE

Okay-okay.

FALCO

And, you know, none - none of the other businesses near us were open at the time either
so.

JUDGE

Okay. Um, generally when these individuals provided these services were they also on
duty being paid by Unified Police Department?

33
34

FALCO

Um, you'd have to ask him that question ...

3S

JUDGE

Oh okay.

36
37

FALCO

... but my understanding was that this would be off duty hours for them.

39

JUDGE

Okay. Alright, um, and, um, you indicated they were paid by the hour, correct?

40
4~

FALCO

Yeah. We were billed by the hour, yes.

JUDGE

Okay. Alright. Um, any other testimony that you would like to provide as to whether or
not these individuals are independent contractors or - or employees?

2
3
4

@'

5
6
7
8
9
IO
11
12
13
. 14
15
16
17
18
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~
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FALCO

(Unintelligible) 88.

RIVERA

Even back in, uh, - so, this has been revised as 2010. So, no time between 201 Oand
today have you ever - have you - bad you seen this policy depart - Unified, uh, Police
Department, uh, police officer, uh, agreement, had you seen one of these?

FALCO

I hadn't seen one, no. Like I said we were doing it on such a random and sporadic basis
that, um, we didn't, as far as I know, have aco~tract with them, a written contract, but no
I haven't seen one.

RIVERA

So, the Unified Police Oepartment never provided you one of, uh, this document then.
That's what you' re stating, correct?

2

3

4
5
6
7
8
9
JO
II
12
13
14

,,FALCO

15

Ci)

Correct I don't see a signed document in here by me so, and I don't recall signing one
so.

16

17
18
19

RIVERA

You don't recall ever having read this agreement?

FALCO

No, uh-uh. What's that? Not until I saw it in this Exhibit.

JUDGE

To your knowledge did anyone else for the organization sign such a document?

20
21

22
23
24
25
26

FALCO

I would have to check around. To my knowledge no. I mean I would assume if someone
signed it we would have a signed copy in your Exhibit.

JUDGE

27
28
29
30

Well, the Department wouldn't have it unless you gave it to us so, um, she's just asking,
and - and I'm asking, whether or ·not you have any knowledge as to whether the
Appellant, anyone for the Appellant, si~ed such an agreement.

FALCO

No.

RIVERA

So, your arrangement with U - uh, Unified Police Department was strictly verbal? You
just called 'em up and requested additional security for your property?

31
32

33
34
35

FALCO

We_ requested it - additional police presence, yeah, and especially in high time - high
risk times we would ask for additional and low risk times we'd probably not have as
much coverage.

RIVERA

Um, then did the police department explain to you how they would be sending their
police officers?

42
43
44

FALCO

Um, they just said they would have a police presence here when we requested it. That's
all they told us. That's all we wanted.

45

RIVERA

And they told you how much it - that cost would be?

36
37

38

39
40

41
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JUDGE

You're welcome.

HANSEN

Hansen is present.

JUDGE

Alright Mr. Hansen, this is Judge Gibbs. I'd like to go ahead and take your testimony.
Mr. Hansen, do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you will give will be the
whole truth and nothing but the truth?

HANSEN

I do.

JUDGE

Please state your full name for the record.

HANSEN

Kenneth William Hansen.

JUDGE

Mr. Hansen, what is your job title or position?

HANSEN

I'm a Detective with Unified Police Department. I am the Secondary Employment
Coordinator.

JUDGE

Okay and, um, can you describe to - to me the relationship between the Unified Police
Department and the - this organization the Fur Breeders Agricultural Cooperative with
respect to having police officers provide some services to the Fur Breeders Association?

HANSEN

Although I wasn ,t the Secondary Employment Coordinator when this started, um, the re
- I think the relationship was based - it was - my - looking back when it first started it
appeared to be kind of a seasonal arrange - ar - uh, relationship, and as I recall, uh, based
on the narrative on the job description it was based on a threat of, uh, vandalism, um, uh,
coming from animal rights groups.

JUDGE

And what is the Unified Police Department's role in having security or extra police
present around the Appellant's facility? What role does the Unified Police Department
play i~ connection with the individuals that actually provide the services?

HANSEN

Well, our role is - is strictly as a law enforcement presence. Um, a, uh, - as usual to
preserve life and property.

JUDGE

Um, but why - why is the Unified Police Department involved rather than just the
Appellant, the company or organization, contacting th~se officers individually and asking
them to provide security officer duties or services?

HANSEN

It's the policy of Unified Police Department that all secondary employment go through
the Secondary Employment, um, Coordinator. They have to complete some, uh,
paperwork to be approved to do that They also have to use our Secondary Employment
System 'called Power Detail, uh, that requires them to agree, uh, to certain, uh, crjteria
before they can get into that system, but, uh, UPD it kinda functions as a clearing house
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and we do this to avoid corruption and to make the distribution to off duty employment
fair for everyone.

2
3
4

JUDGE

Okay. So, um, so the - Mr. Falco had indicated that at some point the organization had
contacted the Unified Police Department asking for additional police presence there for
the reasons that you also described. So, why isn't it the case that the Unified Police
Department just doesn't send their officers there as part of their primary duties and - and
just, uh, proli - provide that police presence rather than calling it secondary employment
and having the Appellant pay these officers directly?

HANSEN

Well, Judge we don't .... I - I don't think we have the - the luxury of doing that for any
particular business just, um, because of the - the cost of- of doing police work. We just
-we can't assign, uh, on duty police officers, uh, to a business by a- or any kin(j of a,
you know, maybe more than a day or two.

5
6
7
8
9
10

11
12
13

14
15
16
17
18
19

JUDGE

Okay. Um, when the officers provided services to the Appellan~ um, were they wearing
Unified Police Department's uniforms?

HANSEN

Required on the job description in our Power Details program to - to wear a Unified
Police Department.

JUDGE

Okay and so, while they were providing these services to the Appellant, um, is it the case
that Unified Police Department was not al.so paying them for that same time?

HANSEN

No. They're only paid their- when they go through our system and when they sign up to
be in.our system they have to - to agree that the relationship, um, although arranged by
UPD the arrangement is actually between the Employer and the officer. Uh, UPD
doesn't, uh, doesn't pay them, uh, for that work.

JUDGE

Okay. Um, are officers, according to Unified Police Department, are officers able to
provide services as an officer or a security officer to anyone they want or ~o they have to
go, according to Unified Police Department policy, have to go through your - your
program that the Unified - the Secondary Employment Program with your department?

34
35

HANSEN

Yes. In order to maintain the service, uh, that I'd talked about. ..

36
37

JUDGE

Okay.

HANSEN

... they have to go through that system and that - that system unless they're grouped
separately, um, like at hospitals and - and such where they're regular, uh, employees, uh,
twice a month they, uh, they can sign up for one job for the, um, the two weeks after that
initial two weeks. For example, on October 1st they can sign up for one job between, um,
October 16th and the end of October, October 31 st, just as - as an example. They're all
secondary employment. It's coordinated, uh, through the Seconqary Employment
Coordinator, uh, just because of the fairness issue and past issues with favoritism and
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police secondary employment
2
3

JUI)GE

Okay. So, what if one of these officers, and that - that are involved here, um, what if
they knew of a private company that wanted security officer services and, uh, could he or
·she just provide those services understanding they would not be representing the Unified
Police Department, they'd be wearing another uniform or plain clothes or whatever,
could they contract with an independent business just to provide ~ecurity officer services?

HANSEN

Uh, if they did that would - uh, they'd be violating our policy.

JUDGE

Okay. Um, okay. Even though they would be off duty and they wouldn't be wearing or
representing the department in any way if they wanted to ser - they - according to the

4

5
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7
8 .
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10
11

(i)

12
13
14

15

Employer's policy they're not allowed to do that?

HANSEN

16

17
18

No because they're· still acting, um, you know, - their a law enforcement officer
(unintelligible) certified; but they're all - they also have to be working for a police
department or a law enforcement agency. So, um, becal:15e they're - they're essentially
an off duty officer the)."re still representing UPD so that is something they can't do.
.,

19

20

JUDGE

21

22

23
24
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26
27
28
29
30

HANSEN

Well, at UPD we don't have what's called a quarter master system. They receive, um,
about $700 dollars a year, however, the officer's - it's up to them to pay for their
equipment. Some officers purchase their own side arms, um, but they purchase their own
bQdy armor, um, you know, any-any extra stuff. Then $700 dollars, whatever it is, it's
like $45 dollars a paycheck it doesn't really go a long way. So, officers will have like
additional lights and body annor, their own weapons. So, some of the equipment they
have is purchased, um, like most of it is purchased by them. They do receive a - a - it's
not a reimbursement or a quarter master system, but they do receive so much a year to
pay for the uniforms.

JUDGE

So, is the $700 dollars, uh, that you indicated likely insufficient to pay those cost, is that
the purpose of that $700 dollars is to pay for uniforms, weapons, tools, whatever they
need to provide their services?

39
40

HANSEN

Well, it-it pays - I mean the department will issue you a weapon. Most officers ...

41

ruDGE

Okay.

42
43
44

HANSEN

... have their own - own- own weapons. It- the thing that it probably doesn't cover,
um, -doesn't appear to be covering is- are things-expensive things like body armor,
uh ...

31
32

@

. Okay-okay. Um, any, um, tools or equipment or supplies, firearms, or protective gear,
anything that they use when they pro0ded ser-vices to the Appellant? Do you know ifthe
officers are required to pay for those themselves or has someone else already pl.Jfchased
those?
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2

JUDGE

Okay.

3
4

HANSEN

... you know, a pair- a pair of boots could be $200 and $250 dollars, body armor is a
thousand, um, a side arm is anywhere from about 450 to 600.

JUDGE

Okay.

HANSEN

There's a lot of equipment like lights and such that they purchase on their own.

JUDGE

But I would take it that, uh, with respect to the individual officers that are at issue in this
case, that you would not have any firsthand knowledge as to specifically any equipment
that they had purchased on their own?

s
6
7
8
9

10
11
)2
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14
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HANSEN

I don't and it would be difficult because of the way Power Detail System works. There's
no guarantee that the same officer will ever work here. Um, it's because of the one job,
uh, rules that we have for the one job they can get that day. A lot of times an officer, um,
won't be able to get the same job for, you know, maybe months at a time. So, it would be
a lot of different officers, that usually work at"the different, uh, locations.

JUDGE

Okay. TQ your knowledge, um, I know you have-you indicated that this is policy that,
uh, they cannot independently go out and, uh, enter into a contract to provide security
officer services. Do you know if that's, uh, not just the Unified Police Department
policy, but do you know if that's against the law for, uh, an employee active police
officer to do?

HANSEN

I believe, um, state statutes says, and I know Harry can maybe help me with this, but I've
been working a little bit on this, the state statute said that law enforcement can't get a
private security license. I know they can't be, uh, private security agents. So, I think
that, um, they can't really be private secwity ...

JUDGE

Okay.

HANSEN

... and I -and I don't - and maybe can Harry- Harry can help me with this, but I don't
believe that by our policy they can ~e private security.

ruDGE

Okay.

HANSEN

And, uh,just to go along with that I don't know of any, um, any of my officers that, um,
that function that way.

41
42
43

JUDGE

0 kay. Alright. ·

44

HANSEN

They may work as law enforcement officers, ~' for a private security company if they
need that kind of a - a - an issue, but they can't - I don't think they can own or be a - a
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- own a private ~urity company..
2

JUDGE

Okay. Um, so do these - the individuals that provided services at- at thi~, uh, company
or this organization did they, to your knowledge, also provide similar services for other
companies?

HANSEN

Yes they do. Most of them, um, work for, uh, different companies, um, that- that well, I'll give you an example, like, um, a construction company that's building a
building. We have officers that work at, uh, like the Marathons and all of the different
races for different companies. We have a lot of, um, a lot ofissues where- I don't-you
probably wouldn't find one officer here that doesn't work for another comp-another,
uh, employer.

JUDGE

Okay, but you're saying that they, uh, they cannot independently do their own thing, but
- as far as security, but, uh, they could work for another security company?

HANSEN

Well, no they ...

JUDGE

Okay.

HANSEN

But it's all coordinated through me. For example, um ...

JUDGE

Okay.

HANSEN

... example, All State called me and said we have a, um, a client who's an attorney who's
been threatened by one of the customers because of a claim declination.

JUDGE

Okay.

30

HANSEN

31
32
33

And they - officer there so, a national security com_pany going through me, uh,
coordinated that so we could use an officer to help that.

JUDGE

Okay- okay. Alright, um - alright, um, let me see here. Mr. Falco, do you have any
questions for Mr. Hansen? Mr. Falco are you there?

FALCO

Uh, no I don't really have any questions for him. I, you know, I know that the police
officers that were here at our last Hearing did talk about some of their expenses that they
did incur and I don't know if the Judge feels that's important eno1,1gh to maybe try to
contact them and have them give further testimony to that or not.

41

JUDGE

Well, we'll face that, uh! a little later on, but do you have any other questions_ for him?

42
43

FALCO

No, not really.

JUDGE

Okay. Uh, Mr. Souvall, uh, do you have questions for Mr. Hansen?
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2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

SOUVALL

Just a few ~o clarify.

JUDGE

Okay.

SOUVALL

Um, uh, Detective Hansen, um, when, uh, -just to sort of explain a little bit better the
. process here. _Officers volunteer for, uh, secondary employment opportunities do they
not?

IO

HANSEN

They do.

11
12
13

JUDGE

Okay. I can't have you asking lead - leading questions even though ...

14
15

SOUVALL

Okay, um...

)6

JUDGE

Okay.

17
18
)9

SOUVALL

Alright I'll rephrase it
opportunities?

21

HANSEN

Yes.

22
23
24

SOUVALL

Do these officers have the ability to say they don't wanna work a secondary employment
opportunities even if they've worked 'em in the past?

HANSEN

Yes. They-they can, uh, cancel fromjobs or not sign up, but, um, it's up to them and
then some of our jobs have back up officers. So, if that officer chooses not to go to that
job then there -there's another officer usually available or they call me and I try and find
somebody.

SOUVALL

Does Unified make any money on the, uh, amount of money that officers are paid by
third parties? Unified as in an organization.

HANSEN

No they don't.

SOUVALL

So, this is a pass through entity if somebody, uh, schedules - so, basically then it is
Unified is the scheduling entity and then officers volunteer to do shifts, is that correct?

HANSEN·

That's true and they - and they understand that when they do their secondary
employment request and when they - when they get into the Power Detail software
program they also, um, have to agree to that before they can proceed into the system.

SOUVALL

Okay. Um, uh, no further questions.

JUDGE

Alright. Going back to your testimony, um, Mr. Hansen we have a document, um, that is

~

Do officers, uh, volunteer for secondary employment
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FBAC shall elaborate on the issues as they relate to officers currently employed by Unified
Police Department (hereirudter '6T)Pl)j in the reasonable beliefthat the weight and intent given
to the issues under detenn.ination by Administrative I.aw adjudicator have been misplaced. To
that end, the factors used as aids for determination, per Workforce Services publication fails to
give doe consideration to the guidelines in the aggregate and to the specific facts of 'this
particular instm.lce.
.
FBAC contends that sufficient evidence _and testimony was presented and the specific facts
support:

at

lr FBAC has never bad, nor exetclse control over the officers who provided secondar,y
law enforcement services;
·
2. FBAC provided no training or instruction in the perfbnmmce of the services provided.
by officers, as otherwise employees ofUPD, all having been previously tramed
through/by the Utah St.ate Police Academy, with additional in-house academy
ttaining through UPD and tJPD',: rnanda:tory 40 hours/year BllJ1Uld 1raining;
3. FBAC, due to a past history of extensive criminal and tem>rist-like destruction
(J11Cluding arson that fully destroyed its home offices and sumnmding facilities at
8700 South 700 West, Sandy, Salt Lake Coun1y, Utah) reasonably demanded law
enforcement presence that was not otherwise available due to UPD manpower
restrictions and the vast area otherwise assigned to officers on scheduled duty;
4.. FBAC premises. By very definition of the law enforcement services and as
recogniz.cd by Wolk Fm:ce Services ''Guidelines", under work criteria, the services
were unique and could only be performed at or near FBAC's premises;
S. FBAC neither selected any particular officer who perfooned law enforoement
services, never met or bad personal and/or employmeut conversations with any
officer, and provides no guidance on how those officers provide security to FBAC;
6r FBAC does not rnainmin a continuous relationship with UPD or any one particular
officer, but mther over periods of time in which FBAC reasonably believes thete is a
viable and realistic threat, and would discontin1JC any such relationship at any time
such threats ere diminirnus;
7r Houm. ofUPD ~ e ·are a function ofatler-hours, when no FBAC employees are
or on the premises with the actual security period to be determined by tho

officers;

·- -- ·· •·•· -

8. UPD officers performing secondary employment (law enforcement presence at or
near FBAC as always subject to being summoned by UPD dispatchers to respond to
any other law enforcement issue, all ·of which take preference· over any secondary
duties rendered to/for FBAC;
9, UPD has purchased and uses a software progrmn known as "PowerDETAILS" which
provides the officer with fair and equal opportunity to obtain secondary employment,
of which FBAC represents less than one (1) pe.rocmt of actual secondary employment
-- -- -· - - --· fot these of6cets and requites each officer to enter post-service hours after each night
of actual services. FBAC does not have access 10 the "PowerDETAILS" software
and has no control over thd selection·of officers providing security to FBAC;
1o. UPD officers providing secondary law enforcement service are in fact engaged in an

2IPage
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independently e~lished ~ occupation, profession, or bgsiness of the same
nature bi tlJ.at they are all employed by UPD and certified as police officers by Peace
Officers Stm;idards and Tndning;

11. FBAC pro'Vides no tools or equipment. The officers have their own meatID.S and
sewrity type tools a.nd equipment, further providing security using a squad car as

provided by UPD;
12. FBAC represents less than one (1) percent of the secondary employment for UPD
officers;

13. UPD ofticen provide their own UPD ucifonns, body armor and in some instances,
their personal choice of service firearms;
14. Officers performing secondary employment services are always at risk for nonpayment, much the same as any other heavily service oriented services that require
little addition.al out-of-pocket expenses;
.
IS. UPD officer, s secondary employment service has 1h:clved -ria word of mouth and thus
constitutes the most effective and efficient form of advertising their availability to
tbe general public:
16. By employment with UPD, officers are by the definition of their employment with
UPD are duly certified by bo1h the State of Utah and UPD
17. UPD officers performing any service hams are issued an annual IRS-1099 foil!l
which iA and of itself is abusiness record that l1lDSt be reported on personal State a.ad
· Federal Income Tax "personal" retums by each officer, in addition UPD
''PowerDETAlLS" retains all secondary work activities for each respective officer;
and,

.

18. Each respective officer perfcmning se«mdary employment, by inherent blwness
record keeping would have a home or residence where $UCh teOOids, clothing,
equipment personal t.o the officer would be kcptlretained/stored. The officer would
have no need for a sepa.mte office or place of business, as their service occurs at/neat
the oustomer' s place ofbusiness.
GROUNDS FOR APPEAL
Appellant hlcorporat.es. by xefetence the foregoing KAppellant Case Overview", inc)~g but
not limited to the citation to all govemi.ng statutes and rules. Further, Appellant places
reasonable emphasis on the Workforce Services publication, as provided by Workforce Services
to Appellant; with reasonable application of the "Guidelines" provision, stating" 'The degree of
importance of each factor wries dependmg on the service and the mctual context in which it is
per.fbrmed.,,
\

Appellant provided testimony, at Hearin& from the Christopher Falco, as General Manager of
FBAC and Detective Ken Hansen, ~ the Secondary Employment Coordinator for UPO.
Appellant asserts that in addition to the herein referenced "Appellant Case Overview", the
following 1$Slles and grounds for review exist:
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